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Values and Value Creation
in Public-Private Transactions
Nestor M. Davidson*

ABSTRACT. Scholars have developed a significant body of literature
exploring the work of deal lawyers with the essential insight that attorneys
acting as transaction-cost engineers have unique potential to add to the
overall value of deals. This value-creation literature has traditionally made
two foundational assumptions about the role of the state in transactional
law. First, scholars have assumed that regulation is essentially irrelevant to
transacting-thatfrom the deal lawyer's perspective, the government is a
factor only to the extent that the state will enforce private agreements.
Second, scholars have assumed that private parties uniformly view public
policy as a constraint in the realm of compliance-that from the deal
lawyer's perspective, clients are indifferent, if not hostile, to regulatorygoals.
The first assumption is the subject of recent scholarship convincingly
arguing that regulatory arbitrage should be added to the picture of deal
lawyers as transaction-costengineers. The second assumption, however, has
gone unchallenged and is the focus of this Article.
Although the value-creation literature envisions a monolithic orientation
toward the state, in practice,partnerships that engage the private sector in
advancing a variety of public goals represent both a significant sector of the
economy and one of the central contemporary approachesto policy by federal,
state, and local governments. Deal lawyers are thus increasingly called upon
not only to reduce transactioncosts and leverage regulatory constraints, but
also to manage a complex alignment of interests between privatemeans and
public ends. In short, lawyers in public-private transactionsperform what
this Article calls regulatory translation-transmognfyingthe often abstract
goals of publicpolicy into the concrete mechanisms of private ordering.

* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. J.D., Columbia Law School,
1997, A.B., Harvard University, 1990. For helpful comments, the author wishes to thank
Deborah Cantrell, Scott Cummings, Vic Fleischer, Clare Huntington, Scott Moss, Pierre Schlag,
Jim Smith, Phil Weiser, and the participants in the 2007 Workshop on Affordable Housing and
Public/Private Partnerships. Charles Swanson and Kelly Kafer provided excellent research
assistance.
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This Article makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, it
identifies an increasingly important transactionalcontext largely ignored by
scholars investigating the work of deal lawyers. Second, the Article gives a
normative, theoreticalgroundingfor that work, providing a framework that
has the potential to enhance the advantages and mute the problems
associated with public-private partnerships. Ultimately, lawyers in this
context can create value in the broadest sense of the word, and there are
lessons in thisfor deal lawyers in all transactions.
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INTRODUCTION

Scholars of the legal profession have long puzzled over the role of
lawyers in transactional practice. Unlike the work of litigators, there is
nothing inherently law-related about many of the characteristic tasks that
deal lawyers undertake. Yet, attorneys command a significant premium for
quarterbacking deals, and there must be some reason that clients continue
to pay that premium for work that might as easily-and at lower cost-be
performed by any number of other professionals.
One answer that has emerged in a robust body of work over the past
two-and-a-half decades has focused on the unique potential that lawyers
have, not only to memorialize agreements and allocate risks, but also to add
fundamentally to the overall value of deals. Lawyers, in this view, have the
capacity to structure deals to minimize a variety of ubiquitous transaction
costs, including parties' information asymmetries, differential time horizons,
and strategic bargaining. This literature envisions lawyers as transactional
engineers, creating value for all parties to a deal with the potential not
simply to slice the deal pie more favorably for one side or the other, but
instead to grow the size of the pie.'
This value-creation literature, however, has traditionally made two
foundational assumptions about the role of the state in transactional law that
bear challenge. First, scholars have assumed that the regulatory environment
in which transactions occur is a background condition largely irrelevant to
the essentially private task facing deal lawyers. As discussed below, Victor

1. The seminal article in the transactional-lawyering value-creation literature was Ronald
J. Gilson's Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239, 243
(1984). In the intervening twenty-five years, scholars have elaborated extensively on Gilson's
framework. See, e.g., Edward A. Bernstein, Law £9 Economics and the Structure of Value Adding
Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REv. 189, 190
(1995) [hereinafter Bernstein, Contract Lawyer] (exploring legal-system costs in transacting);
Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 240
(1995) [hereinafter Bernstein, Silicon Valley] (exploring value creation through lawyer
"counseling, deal making, matchmaking, gatekeeping and proselytizing"); Karl S. Okamoto,
Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 17 (1995) (discussing the role of
reputation in adding transactional value); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of
Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 486, 487 (2007) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Explaining] (empirically testing the value-creation hypothesis); Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to
Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497, 500 (2008) (comparing value
creation by in-house and outside counsel); George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise
Architects, 64 Bus. LAw. 279 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1264063 (seeking to
expand Gilson's model to other aspects of business lawyering, including enterprise design).
Robert Mnookin and others have added important insights related to strategic behavior in
negotiating dynamics. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DIsPUTEs 127-55 (2000) (discussing various dynamics of
negotiations); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1995) (reviewing strategic-behavior and
psychological barriers to transacting). For further discussion, see infra Part II.A.
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Fleischer and others have begun to upend this assumption, arguing
convincingly that engineering regulatory costs is as central to the
contemporary deal lawyers' role as adding value by responding to
2
transaction costs.
The second assumption-and the focus of this Article-is that
transactions are unilaterally private. In the transactional world envisioned by
the traditional value-creation literature, not only is the government little
more than a neutral referee, but the state in no way takes an active role in
engaging the private sector to advance public goals. This may have been true
a generation ago, but in the modern transactional world, public-private
partnerships are a significant and growing sector of the economy and have
become one of the most important approaches to policy at the federal, state,
and local level. Even before the recent wave of massive interventions in the
financial sector and other areas of our economy,3 public-sector spending
represented nearly a third of the domestic economy, 4 a singularly vast
incursion into what might otherwise be considered the private market.
Although much of this spending represents direct government outlays-for
employees, direct benefit transfers, and the like-governments at all levels
are increasingly relying on private-sector capabilities. Public-private
partnerships touch almost every modern policy area, including national
security, infrastructure, economic development, energy, social services, and
environmental protection. The growing presence of private actors in the
public arena is a deeply contested development-sparking a debate that has
direct relevance to the work of deal lawyers 5-but represents a clear trend
6
nonetheless.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. The crisis that by the fall of 2008 had come to grip the global economy spawned a
series of responses by the federal government, including notably a multi-trillion-dollar publicprivate program from the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve to unlock frozen credit
markets, see Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Bailout Plan: $2.5 Trillion and a Strong U.S.
Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at Al (discussing a proposed public-private bailout fund). A
nearly $800 billion economic stimulus plan passed in February 2009 also contemplated
significant public-sector funding for private-sector initiatives around infrastructure, energy, and
many other areas. See Farhana Hossain et al., The Stimulus Plan: How to Spend $787 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/44thpresident/stimulus (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
4. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:
HISTORICAL TABLES 318 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/
hist.pdf (noting that federal and state spending currently represents thirty-two percent of the
domestic economy).
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. Private-sector involvement in the public arena is an important element of an approach
to policy that has been labeled "new governance"-a set of policy tools that emphasize localized
and decentralized decisionmaking, market-based methods, and stakeholder empowerment. See
generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (advocating a "Renew Deal," breaking
from traditional models of regulation, administration, and adjudication); Jason M. Solomon,
Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819 (2008) (discussing two
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Foregrounding public-private partnerships provides a richer
description of the actual continuum of contemporary transactional practice.
Any given deal can be seen to occupy a point along a spectrum of state
involvement-from a paradigm of the purely private transaction where the
state is primarily an indifferent referee, to an opposing paradigm of near
complete alignment of interests between the private and public sectors, with
private dealmaking in regulated environments in between. Either end of this
spectrum represents an unrealistic ideal type-the state is almost never
neutral, nor is there ever a perfect alignment of public and private
interests-but the continuum provides a more accurate picture of the
varying roles the state actually takes in transactional law.
Focusing on the largely unexplored region of this transactional
spectrum that involves some alignment of public and private interests, this
Article asks whether lawyers involved in public-private partnerships do
something different than their counterparts working in more private-sectororiented deals. The short answer is yes. What is fundamentally different
about deal lawyers in the public-private context is that the "value" they
create cannot be divorced from the public-policy goals that the private
sector has been engaged to advance. For deal lawyers in public-private
partnerships, the programmatic and transactional contexts, as well as their
clients' own mission-driven goals, necessitate a broader perspective on the
concept of value. Deal lawyers in this context must contend with a
challenging double layering, structuring deals to balance economic value
creation with essentially non-economic-indeed, often counter-markettransactional goals. Thus, unlike garden-variety private transactions, the endproduct of public-private partnerships cannot be captured simply in
economic terms, although the underlying economics can be as important as
7
the policy goals that drive the partnership.
Accordingly, beyond structuring for transaction costs and leveraging
regulatory constraints, deal lawyers in public-private partnerships must also
anticipate myriad challenges posed by engaging the private sector in
responding to complex social problems. This function-which this Article

books, LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Griinne de B(irca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006), and LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS (2006), and their role in the development of scholarly
discussion of the regulatory state).
7.
As discussed below, see infra Part MA, this is not to argue that policy objectives cannot
be monetized, although doing so remains controversial in many areas. Clearly, public goals in
realms as disparate as health care, education, environmental protection, and criminal justice

can be translated into strictly fiscal terms (as is regularly done by economists and policymakers).
Cf Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricingthe Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1557-59, 1578-80 (2002) (discussing and critiquing the

process of monetizing policy objectives). Rather, this is simply to make a point-that might
seem prosaic at first, but has significant implications-about the goal orientation of entities
entering into public-private partnerships.
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calls regulatory translation-requires structuring private transactions to reflect
the ofttimes abstract or conflicting goals of public policy, frequently in
political environments, where the ultimate beneficiaries are some segment
of the public. Deal lawyers in public-private transactions can create value in
much the same way that the traditional transactional-engineering literature
has highlighted, but they also have the potential to add value in no small
part by translating their clients' and the government's policy goals into the
practical mechanisms of private ordering. Deals are thus created that would
otherwise collapse, and deals are made more valuable in the broadest sense
of the word. These lawyers, in short, hold the potential not only to make the
8
pie bigger, but to help bake a very different pie.
In identifying and explaining regulatory translation, this Article seeks to
make contributions to two traditionally distinct academic discourses. First,
the Article brings to the fore an increasingly important transactional context
8. It is appropriate at the outset to clarify the scope of this discussion. To begin, although
the government is often represented in public-private partnerships and government attorneys
can be intimately involved in some kinds of public-private transactions, this Article focuses on
the work of private-sector rather than public-sector attorneys. This is because the paradigm
transaction contemplated in this Article is not between the government and the private sector,
as in traditional public contracting, see infra Part IILA, but rather, between private parties acting
pursuant to a government program.
Next, the kinds of transactions on which this Article focuses are generally handled by
private attorneys not acting in a pro bono capacity. Many law firms have developed pro bono
transactional practices. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12325 (2004) (discussing law firm pro bono transactional work). This Article, however, focuses on
the traditional fee-paying transactional work that makes up the bulk of deal practice in publicprivate partnerships.
Moreover, scholars have examined the role of transactional lawyers in serving both
individual clients in communities in need and causes on behalf of those clients. See, e.g., Susan
R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: TransactionalLawyering for Social
Change and EconomicJustice,4 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 202-07, 218-23 (1997) (discussing the work
of transactional lawyers in supervising law students working in legal clinics and helping clients
start small businesses); Ann Southworth, Business Planningfor the Destitute? Lawyers as Facilitators
in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1121, 1132-40 (reviewing a study of
planning projects completed by attorneys). Public-interest-oriented lawyering is certainly an
important aspect of transactional practice in public-private partnerships, particularly in certain
areas of social-welfare policy, but it represents only a portion of the larger mosaic of lawyer
involvement with clients involved in public programs.
Finally, although this Article focuses on lawyers in the transactional context, this is not
to minimize other roles that lawyers undertake-beyond litigating-in mediating public policy
for private clients, particularly in communities in need. Lawyers can, and do, serve clients
through empowerment, education, strategy, and organizing, among other tasks not traditionally
associated with lawyers as litigators or lawyers as scriveners. Cf Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is
Not the Protagonist:Community Campaigns, Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2133, 2137-45
(2007) (discussing the role of lawyers in organizing for social change); Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 1-10 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006)
(discussing the increasing variety and complexity of cause lawyering and related lawyer roles).
The social impact of lawyering must be understood in light of all these roles, but this Article
focuses primarily on what lawyers do in dealmaking.
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that has been largely ignored in the literature on value creation. Conversely,
the Article likewise brings the descriptive and normative insights of the
value-creation literature to the literature on new governance and publicprivate partnerships. Just as scholars focused on deal lawyers have largely
ignored public-private partnerships, scholars exploring the private role in
public governance have largely ignored the central and complex role that
such lawyers play in that dynamic. The Article accordingly provides
theoretical grounding for the role that attorneys play in this context that has
the potential to enhance the advantages and mute the concerns associated
with public-private partnerships. Ultimately, there are lessons in this
perspective for deal lawyers in all transactions.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II reviews the literature on value
creation in transactional law and particularly the emerging emphasis in that
literature on the work of deal lawyers in arbitraging regulatory constraints.
Part III turns to the increasingly important realm of public-private
partnerships in a continuum of state involvement in transactional law,
noting the significant debates that such private-sector involvement has
raised. Part IV then argues that transactional lawyers in public-private
partnerships have potential to add value in a multitude of ways by translating
public-policy goals into the hard work of real-world dealmaking, as noted,
through the task of regulatory translation. Recognizing perennial challenges
that the value-creation literature has faced in proving its insights, this Part
also offers a concrete case study to illustrate regulatory translation in
practice. Finally, Parts V and VI consider some normative challenges to this
role for deal lawyers and, conversely, some significant benefits that might
flow from recognizing and enhancing the work of lawyers in public-private
deals.
II.

VALUE CREATION IN TRANSACTIONAL LAwYERING

Nearly twenty-five years ago, Ronald Gilson famously asked, "What do
business lawyers really do?" 9 Gilson's answer was that business lawyers
increase the overall value of deals by structuring transactions to minimize
information asymmetries, find mutual gain in responding to parties'
differential expectations, and likewise engineer a variety of other transaction
costs. 10 Scholars have developed a substantial literature to refine and expand
this model, particularly for environments where regulatory constraints drive
deal structure, but Gilson's essential insight remains influentialtransactional lawyers at their best have unique potential to "make the pie
l
grow larger rather than merely to help to carve it up."

9.
10.
11.

Gilson, supra note 1, at 241.
Id.at255.
Id. at 308.

HeinOnline -- 94 Iowa L. Rev. 944 2008-2009

VALUES AND VALUE CREATION

In order to frame an analysis of deal lawyers' work in public-private
partnerships, this Part reviews the insights at the core of the traditional
value-creation literature and then discusses the contemporary regulatory
direction to which that literature has turned.
A.

VALUE CREATION TRADITIONALLY UNDERSTOOD

Lawyers stand at the heart of commercial transactions of any significant
value, serving a wide range of practical roles-business and legal negotiator,
document drafter, information gatherer, coordinator, as well as, of course,
/awyer. In all of these capacities, it is fair to ask whether-and how-lawyers
benefit the transaction and why other professionals, or clients themselves,
could not as easily or more efficiently perform the same, often quite costly,
12
tasks.
In tackling these questions, three visions of deal lawyers can be distilled
from the literature.13 The most banal picture is perhaps that of deal lawyers
as scriveners, whose essential task is to make sure that the contractual terms
of their clients' agreements are captured and enforceable. In this capacity,
there is little that deal lawyers do that could not be done by anyone skilled
enough to fill in a standard form; putting attorneys in this role can be seen
as both a barrier to dealmaking and little more than an unwarranted cost. As
Gilson noted, lawyers viewed in this light are often seen as more of a
hindrance than a help-at worst, "deal killers whose continual raising of
obstacles

14

. . .

ultimately causes transactions to collapse under their own

weight."
A more complex, but still incomplete, account envisions the deal lawyer
as the professional best able to identify and allocate transactional risk. 15 In
this capacity, deal lawyers zealously seek to minimize their clients' risk
exposure by offloading as much risk as possible on the other parties to the
deal and manage other professionals to identify and quantify such risks.
Lawyers in this mode are characteristically oriented toward negotiating and
12. Gilson argued that to assess the value that a lawyer may add to a transaction, one must
examine the transaction as a whole, rather than in terms of the gains that any one client might
achieve through redistribution of static value. See id. at 245.
13. Although much of the work of business lawyers is not transactional, such as structuring
entities and advising on compliance and corporate "housekeeping" matters, see Dent, supra note
1, at 295-309, this discussion focuses on deal lawyering.
14. Gilson, supra note 1, at 242. In a vivid example of the regard with which deal lawyers
are sometimes held, Victor Fleischer relates a recent description of deal lawyers circulating on
the Internet as "'monkey f***ing scribe [s].'" Victor Fleischer, The MasterCardIPO: Protectingthe
PricelessBrand, 12 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 137, 139 (2007) (quoting Posting of Victor Fleischer to
The Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/03/monkey-scribes.html (Mar. 7,
2006)).
15. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 13-14 (3d ed. 2007) ("To a large extent the lawyer is hired to
identify and manage the wide assortment of risk that can and should be anticipated in a
particular transaction.").
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memorializing deals in ways that parallel the adversarial clash of litigation,
with no quarter given and no quarter asked.
Gilson, however, offered a third vision of what deal lawyers do. 16 Gilson
began with the proposition that in the absence of transaction costs, parties
would reach agreement-they would price the asset that is the subject of a
deal and, by extension, concur on the other material terms of the
transaction-with perfect information. 17 In this transactional environment,
18
there would be no need for lawyers or any other third-party intermediaries.
In the real world, of course, transaction costs are pervasive. Parties have
different time horizons and expectations about the future, for example, as
well as significantly different information about the inputs to the transaction
and ability and incentives to gather that information. To these barriers,
Robert Mnookin and others have added the reality that parties can behave
irrationally in negotiating and tend to bring incentives to any transaction to
act strategically, undermining the potential for mutual gain. 19
It is in the gap between the unreal assumption of perfect transacting by
rationally acting parties and the transaction-cost-filled world of imperfect
information and strategic behavior that lawyers have the potential to add
value. 20 Business lawyers serve, in Gilson's term, as "transaction-cost
engineers," devising mechanisms through which market imperfectionsprimarily heterogeneous expectations and information-cost failures-can be
unearthed and addressed. 21 Lawyer-facilitated cooperative bargaining thus
has the potential to create more valuable transactions by solving
transactional failures to save deals that would otherwise collapse, lowering
the overall cost of a deal and shifting the focus of negotiations away from

16.

See Gilson, supra note 1, at 253-56 (discussing the role of business lawyers as

"transaction cost engineers"). As Mark Suchman has argued, the orientation of much of the
value-creation literature toward transaction-cost economics risks paints an overly narrow picture
of the dynamics of deal lawyering. See Mark C. Suchman, Translation Costs: A Comment on
Sociology and Economics, 74 OR. L. REv. 257, 260-72 (1995) (discussing cultural norms, power
relations, and path dependency as alternative explanatory variables absent from primarily
economic accounts of business lawyering). To draw on the framework that Gilson and his
successors have laid out is not to suggest that it provides the only, or even necessarily a
complete, description of the work of transactional attorneys.
17. 'Gilson derived this transaction-cost-free baseline from the financing concept of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, which assumes that the price of an asset will costlessly reflect future
income. The model accordingly presumes that capital assets will be priced based on market
forces operating with perfect information, a counterfactual assumption that would make the
cost of any third-party intermediary a loss to the transacting parties. See Gilson, supra note 1, at
251 (discussing the transaction costs of hiring a lawyer).
18. Indeed, as Gilson argued, under these assumptions, "fees charged by business lawyers
would," by definition, "decrease the net value of the transaction." Id.
19.

See MNOOKIN

ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 127-55

(reviewing strategic-behavior and

psychological barriers to transacting); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 10-13 (same).
20. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 7-8.
21. Gilson, supra note 1, at 255.
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potentially destructive distributional bargaining that engenders mistrust and
opportunism.
Gilson illustrated the value-creation function for deal lawyers through
provisions in a standard acquisition agreement. 22 Thus, for example, a
contingent-price arrangement that transforms expected returns into certain
returns can alleviate the challenge that investors have heterogeneous
expectations about the future risk and return of an asset. 23 Similarly, an
earnout provision that constrains opportunistic behavior by tying purchase
price to future events can alleviate a mismatch in the time frame over which
investors measure risk and return. 24 Finally, Gilson describes a variety of
representations, warranties, indemnifications, and legal opinions as tools to
25
respond to information-cost problems.
There is an important empirical question that suggests a note of caution
in taking too rosy a view of the description that Gilson and his successors
offer of deal-lawyer value creation. That question involves the relativevalue to
a client of the gains from value-creating lawyering versus the distributional
consequences to that client from participating in the kind of cooperative
behavior that Gilson highlights. In other words, if the increase in the size of
the pie yields less than the benefits to keeping a larger slice of a smaller pie,
then a client has every incentive to act strategically or otherwise add to total
costs-short of killing a deal-to capture that relative advantage. 26 This
empirical question remains unanswered, 27 but it is hard to deny at least the
potential for transactional dynamics that reflect the optimistic role for deal
28
lawyers that Gilson and his successors have identified.
For present purposes it is sufficient that the value-creation literature
highlights a practical framework for understanding a function that deal

22.

See id. at 257-62 (reviewing the role of the business lawyer in the acquisition process).

23.

Id. at 264.

24.

Id. at 266.

25.

Id. at 267-93.

26.
Cf Bernstein, Contract Lawyer, supra note 1, at 195 (observing that practicing lawyers
"who are properly concerned only with the well being of their clients, frequently fail to
understand that a reduction in joint costs can benefit their client perhaps because, in practice,

many actions that increase the value of a transaction as a whole decrease the value of a
transaction to one of the parties").
27. See infra Part IV.B for further discussion of the empirical challenges attendant to
proving value creation.
28. In this vein, David Driesen and Shubha Ghosh argue that there is another side to the
role of transaction costs in dealmaking that Gilson's framework ignores. Driesen and Ghosh
point out that transaction costs may have corresponding benefits, and that structuring
transactions single-mindedly to minimize transaction costs ignores this side of the ledger. See
David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost
Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIz. L. REv. 61, 88 (2005). This is a valuable perspective,
but to identify value from reducing transaction costs is not to argue that this should be the only
role-or even the most normatively attractive role-for deal lawyers to play.
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lawyers can-although by no means always wi1129-serve in structuring to
reduce strategic behavior and increase the realm of mutual gain. These are
practical skills, however, that are not limited to adding value solely from
transaction-cost barriers.
B.

BEYOND NEUTRALITY TO THE STA7E: REGULATORY "CRAFTSMANSHIP"

The vision of lawyers as transaction-cost engineers that emerged from
the value-creation literature has from the outset made a foundational
assumption about the role of regulation in transactional law. That
assumption is that the state is essentially a neutral referee, standing
functionally outside the private arena and largely indifferent to the content
or results of private bargaining. Indeed, Gilson dismissed the potential for
value creation from what he described as "manipulation of a regulatory
system," 30 arguing that most business lawyers operate "in a world in which
regulation has made few inroads." 31 To Gilson, the "critical rule of law is that
32
a court will enforce whatever the lawyer writes."
As Edward Bernstein has pointed out, the assumption that private
lawyers can ignore what he called "legal system" costs is unrealistic.3 3 In
practice, any party seeking to enforce an agreement must contend with the
cost of enforcement and the risk that the legal system may interpret an
agreement in a way that is contrary to what one or the other party
contemplated at the time of contracting. 34 This injects some measure of
uncertainty to Gilson's minimalist vision of the state as a transactional
35
referee.

29. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path & Pride: Third-Pany Closing Opinion Practice
Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 59, 113-24 (2005)
(providing contrasting explanations of value creation in the context of third-party closingopinion practice).
30. Gilson, supra note 1, at 244.
31.
Id. at 247.
32. Id.
33. See Bernstein, Contract Lawyer, supra note 1, at 198 (stating that Gilson's assumption
that courts will enforce whatever the lawyer writes represents the hypothetical world and
ignores the costs of the legal system in the real world); see also Bernstein, Silicon Valley, supra
note 1, at 243 n.22 (stating that the enforcement of a contract can be "costly and inherently
uncertain").
34. See Bernstein, ContractLawyer, supranote 1, at 198 ("[E]ach party faces the prospect of
delay, litigation costs, and the risk that a court may not interpret the contract or calculate
damages in the manner anticipated when the contract was signed..
").
35. It remains open to debate the extent to which contract drafters place litigation risks at
the center of their work. Compare Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, AnticipatingLitigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 818 (2006) (outlining a "theory of contract design that
anticipates the enforcement of contracts by adversarial litigation"), with Schwarcz, Explaining,
supra note 1, at 497 (presenting empirical research to suggest that the primary role for
transactional attorneys is to "provide a roadmap for the parties to follow in their ongoing
relationship" and only "secondarily to minimize the potential for ex post litigation").
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An even more fundamental challenge to this neutral-state view,
however, is the proposition, put forth by Victor Fleischer, that in the
modern transactional world, managing regulatory constraints may be as
important, if not more important, an element of the value lawyers can add as
non-regulatory transaction costs. 3 6 The paradigm of the private client largely
indifferent to regulation, if it ever was predominant, is now more of the
exception than the rule. And in our regulatory world, even the most
seemingly mundane private transaction takes place under regulatory
constraints with potential regulatory consequences.
Fleischer argues that lawyers therefore undertake what he calls
"regulatory craftsmanship," in which lawyers engage in the "skillful practice
of massaging the formal structure of a deal to improve its regulatory
treatment without unduly altering the economics of the deal." 37 This
craftsmanship can be seen in tax arbitrage and in attempts to seek more
favorable-or less protective, from the regulator's perspective-oversight
38
treatment.
Fleischer's description echoes what David Schizer has identified in the
tax-planning context as "frictions," which are constraints on transactional
structure that derive from accounting rules, securities regulation, and other
legal or regulatory regimes.3 9 Schizer has argued that tax planners are more
or less successful in working around targeted tax laws depending, in no
small measure, on the effect of these non-tax constraints. 40 In contemporary
transactional practice beyond the tax arena, these kinds of frictions are a
ubiquitous reflection of the modern regulatory state and can derive from
41
any number of forms of regulation.
Gain in this world of regulatory constraints can be derived directly from
the financial advantage to transacting parties that comes from, for example,
tax planning. As Fleischer describes it, dealmaking thus "shift[s] value away
from the government (in the form of taxes) so that more money can be
36. See, e.g.,
Schwarcz, Explaining, supra note 1, at 491 n.35 (discussing Fleischer's
conception of regulatory-cost engineering); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Craftsmanship
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (discussing the importance of managing
regulatory constraints).
37.

Fleischer, supranote 36 (manuscript at 25).

38. As discussed below, evaluating this kind of regulatory arbitrage normatively poses
interesting questions about the role and value of regulation more generally. See infra text
accompanying notes 44-46.
39.
See David M. Schizer, Frictionsas a Constrainton Tax Planning,101 COLUM. L. REv. 1312,
1317-18 (2001) (describing "frictions" as "constraints on tax planning external to the tax law").
40.
See id. at 1319-39 (offering guidance on which tax reforms are easily avoidable and
which are not).
41.
Fleischer's examination of the role of the deal lawyer also builds on Frank Partnoy's
concept of regulatory arbitrage, which Parmoy describes as "financial transactions designed
specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or

laws." Frank Partnoy, FinancialDerivatives and the Costs of Regulatoy Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211,
227 (1997); see also Fleischer, supra note 36 (manuscript at 7) (discussing Partnoy).
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divided amongst" the private transacting parties. 42 Value can likewise be
added by the reduced cost or competitive advantage to be gained from
avoidance of regulatory oversight, streamlined regulatory approval, or more
privately advantageous regulatory treatment of various other aspects of a
transaction. The more unsettled the regulatory arena, moreover, the higher
premium a law firm can charge to help clients navigate-and gain value
43
from managing-regulatory constraints.
Fleischer acknowledges that this descriptive claim raises potentially
challenging normative implications." Regulatory craftsmanship can pit
private benefit against social cost-indeed in the paradigm case of tax
planning, it is designed to do just that. Evaluating whether this occurs in any
particular instance of regulatory craftsmanship or regulatory arbitrage
invites serious questions about the relevant normative baseline. Any public
policy can potentially be seen in a positive light-as welfare-enhancing or as
making society more just or equal, depending on your vocabulary. But, most
policy goals are contested and can be seen in more critical perspective. One
person's preservation of wetlands is another's trampling of property rights.
In the context of regulatory constraints on transactional structure, one
investor's consumer protection is another entrepreneur's unnecessarily
intrusive SEC oversight. Other examples are easy to imagine.
A deal lawyer engaged in regulatory craftsmanship may accordingly
reduce social welfare as often as enhance it, depending on whether the
given regulatory constraint (or tax liability) is welfare-enhancing or not.45 As
with the empirics of Gilson's traditional value-creation theory,46 it remains
an open question whether regulatory craftsmanship adds "value" in a way
that should be embraced or discouraged in any particular context.

42.

Fleischer, supra note 36 (manuscript at 26).

43.

Id. (manuscript at 27-28). Fleischer calls this the "regulatory frontier" and argues that
the ability to practice at this frontier increasingly divides elite law firms from firms that

approach transactions as a commodity practice. Id. (manuscript at 27). This also gives law firms
a comparative advantage, Fleischer argues, over other professionals, because the varied
regulatory expertise required to close complex transactions-from ERISA to environmental
compliance to tax structuring and many others-requires lawyers to stand at the center of the
deal. Id. (manuscript at 29-31).
It is beyond the scope of this Article, but worth investigating further what impact legalmarket pressures have on firms that specialize in various aspects of public-private transactional
law. Given the varied contexts in which public-private partnerships arise-with the profile of
firms involved ranging from the largest global firms to single practitioners-it is harder to
generalize about market advantages in this context.
44.

Id. (manuscript at 32).

45. Cf William E. Kovacic, Law, Economics, and the Reinvention of PublicAdministration: Using
Relational Agreements to Reduce the Cost of Procurement Regulation and Other Forms of Government
Intervention in the Economy, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 141, 144-48 (1998) (discussing the determinants
of potentially inefficient regulation).
46. See infra Part IV.B.
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Fundamentally, however, deal structuring to respond to regulatory
incentives-and the work of ensuring compliance with regulatory
requirements, which is discussed more later 47 -assumes an orientation on
the part of the client toward public policy that ranges somewhere from
indifference to hostility. In other words, adding the regulatory state to the
transactional matrix appropriately situates much modern deal work in a
context in which the state is, in some sense, at the bargaining table. 48 But
this emerging perspective assumes, as a practical matter, a fundamental
conflict between the state and the actual parties to the transaction. In
practice, however, the alignment of public and private interests is much
more complex-a subject to which we now turn.
III.

TRANSACTIONAL LAW IN A PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONTEXT

As noted at the outset, public involvement in the private sector through
spending and regulatory bargains is a vast and growing arena. 49 This
government-influenced sector of the domestic economy generates a realm of
dealmaking that paradigmatically involves private parties oriented either by
mission or by public incentives toward public goals, with some resulting
alignment of public and private objectives. Transactional law in this publicprivate context bears a family resemblance to its more private-sector
counterparts but varies in important ways. This Part accordingly describes
the transactional context of what are often labeled public-private
partnerships. It then outlines the ongoing practical and normative debate
about the larger question of privatization in which these partnerships are
situated.
A.

THE MISSING VARIABLE: THE ALIGNMENT OF
PUBLICAND PRIVATE INTERESTS

It is possible to conceptualize the role of the state in transactional
practice along a private-public spectrum. One hypothetical end of this
spectrum would be "purely private" transactions that involve private parties
largely indifferent to public policy and concerned only with the extent to
which the state will or will not enforce their bargains. This is Gilson's
paradigm case. The spectrum would then move along to a central core of
private transactions that take place in the shadow of the modern regulatory
state, which is Fleischer's paradigm case. It would then shift to a context in
which private and public goals are in some alignment-the paradigm type of
deal that this Article examines. At the other end of the spectrum would be
47.

See infra Part IV.A.2.d.

48.

Cf Fleischer, supra note 36 (manuscript at 26) (discussing the government as a virtual

third party in transactions).

49. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7. Indeed, all indications are that the
government's response to the current economic crisis signals a decided shift toward
increasingly direct involvement in the private sector. See supra note 3.
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another hypothetical point representing "purely public" activities, such as
public contracting and similar direct government endeavors.
Figure 1

Private,
Unregulated

Private,
Regulated

PublicPrivate

Public

In reality, the end points of any distribution of actual transactions are
exceedingly rare and hence somewhat stylized. More importantly, any given
deal can have varying aspects where public and private elements are more or
less prominent. Thus, a corporate transaction structured to minimize tax
consequences may have regulatory constraints at its heart, but there are
undoubtedly myriad aspects of any such transaction that are tangential to
tax planning.
Situating transactions along this spectrum, however, isolates for
discussion the region of the continuum that involves some alignment of
interests between the private sector and public goals. 50 This is the realm of
51
public-private partnerships. Although a notoriously expansive term,
public-private partnerships generally involve the government engaging the
private sector to advance public goals, sometimes through direct spending,
but increasingly often through programs that incentivize private-sector
actors to advance policy goals through tax benefits and other subsidy tools,
including favorable regulatory treatment.
This kind of public-private engagement has a long history in public
infrastructure, economic development, urban renewal, and for the delivery
of an array of general public services. 52 Engaging the private sector to serve
the public has also long been a perennial feature of social-service
provision. 53 In fields as diverse as health care, job training, welfare, and
50.

Corporate social responsibility and similar developments that attempt to foreground

social and environmental concerns in business practice raise a separate possible alignment
between private activities and the public interest, although arguably a more diffused public
interest than the targeted policy orientation of public-private partnerships. See, e.g., John M.
Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theoy Versus Practicein the Corporate
Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 8-23 (2005) (discussing and debating the
consequences of the corporate social-responsibility movement in the United States and
internationally).
51.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: TERMS RELATED TO
BUILDING AND FACILITY PARTNERSHIPS 1 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/

1999/gg99071.pdf (describing the numerous ways the private sector can partner with the
government).
52.

See generally JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE

MEANS (1989) (discussing the issues surrounding the privatization of public undertakings).
53.

See generally MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC

GOOD (2002) (exploring the optimal method for mixing the private and public sectors for
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housing, both nonprofit and, to a lesser (although growing) extent, forprofit entities have often served as the primary vehicles for federal, state, and
local governments to serve communities and individuals in need. The use of
public-private partnerships is increasing as governments at all levels are
caught between demand for public services and limited political will to
54
expand the role of government in providing those services.
In practice, these public-private partnerships take a great variety of
forms. They can, at times, involve some government agency essentially going
out to the market to purchase a relevant good or service for the public.
Medicare, food stamps, and other public benefits can be conceptualized this
way, although the reality is more complex. Often, however, the government
engages the private sector through direct or indirect subsidies or regulatory
benefits. These can range from tax credits that leverage private involvement
to bargains involving favorable regulatory treatment in exchange for what
are presumably (although by no means assuredly) greater public benefits.
Some entities in these public-private partnerships, primarily in the
nonprofit sector, are motivated by the same policy goals that define the
relevant program-providing housing to low-income residents, for example,
or promoting alternative energy. These entities are more "mission-driven,"
in that a central aspect of their motivation for entering into any transaction
is an underlying set of organizational goals that transcend financial return.
Indeed, the nonprofit sector has become increasingly entrepreneurial, and
social entrepreneurs are bringing dealmaking sensibilities to areas of policy
55
that were once considered hidebound.
But in responding to public incentives, private parties may have an
alignment of interests with the relevant policy goals at issue for reasons that
might be entirely divorced from any internal corporate culture or individual
preference. Thus, a telecommunications company may agree to provide
universal service in exchange for certain regulatory benefits, or a private
developer may enter into a community-benefits agreement in exchange for
being able to build a project. In this context, the private party may be a
reluctant participant, and one can legitimately question the potential
negative secondary effects that this kind of regulatory bargaining creates for

society); LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT
RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE (1995) (advocating stronger relationships between

private, nonprofit organizations and the state).
54. See MINOW, supra note 53, at 3 (describing the increasing mixture of public-private
partnerships across many fields). Privatization and public-private partnerships are as much a
part of the international experience as they are a central feature of domestic policy. For a
helpful discussion, see generally THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: LEARNING

FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Graeme Hodge & Carsten Greve eds., 2005).
55. Social venture capital, for example, involves double- or multiple-bottom-line investing
predicated on achieving financial return and social benefits.
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the government. 56 As a practical matter, however, these kinds of regulatory
bargains are ubiquitous, and in taking the bargain, it becomes in the interest
of the private party to advance the relevant public goal. 57 This Article
contemplates an array of transactions that involve more willing participants,
but many of the attorney role consequences that flow from representing
private clients advancing public goals arise regardless of the reasons why
clients get involved in public-private partnerships.
Two important points, then, emerge from this discussion. First, that the
alignment of interests is a spectrum and not a hard dichotomy between
neutrality (or even hostility) to regulatory goals and warm embrace of public
policy. 58 Second, and more importantly, many transactions in the modern

context involve lawyers working with private clients to help solve challenging
social problems.
B.

TRANSACTIONAL LAWAND THE CRJTIQUE OFPRIVATIZATION

To discuss public-private partnerships as a descriptive matter inevitably
raises a deeply contested debate about the merits of privatization. Labels
matter in this context, and to employ the term "public-private partnership,"
with its perhaps benign connotation of cooperation and collaboration, is not
to disavow the negative normative connotations that "privatization" evokes.
Although the paradigm envisioned in this Article varies from some of the
more controversial examples of privatization, 59 it is nonetheless important to
56. Scholars have highlighted the risks associated with public entities in some sense
"selling" regulatory privileges in exchange for public benefits, including skewed regulatory
priorities and the potential for outright corruption. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L.
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 303-04, 308-09, 331 (3d ed. 2005) (noting
the risks of dealmaking and incentive zoning and exploring zoning corruption); Jerold S.
Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land
Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 568-69 (1992) (defining
incentive zoning); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L.
REv. 957, 959-60 (1987) (identifying the benefits and perils of government land-use "dealing").
These concerns are not trivial, but part of a larger discourse on the merits and risks of
privatization discussed in Part III.B.
57. As with the risks that this program structuring poses for public incentives, there are
corresponding hazards on the private side, with the ever-present danger that private parties
acting to advance public goals without their own role motivation may shirk or act strategically to
undermine the goals they have been engaged to advance. Again, this is best addressed in terms
of the general debate on privatization. See infra Part III.B.
58. The alignment of interests between various participants in public-private partnerships
outlined here assumes, of course, an alignment of interests and incentives between attorney and
client. That attorney-client alignment does not always hold true. See William H. Simon, The
Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic ProfessionalResponsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN.
L. REv. 1555, 1556-66 (2008) (discussing the recent problem of lawyers giving clients "bad legal
advice because the clients want[] it"). Although important, the ethical implications of attorney
conflicts of interest are beyond the scope of this Article.
59. To many, privatization is more controversial when responsibility for a traditionally
public function is shifted entirely to the private sector. Here, in contrast, the public and private
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acknowledge significant, and serious, concerns about the engagement of the
60
private sector in the provision of public services under any label.
To oversimplify a rich and diverse discourse, skeptics of privatization
generally raise three related concerns. Such skeptics see private-sector
involvement in public programs as undermining public accountability by
diffusing power to the private sector with inadequate mechanisms for public
oversight. A closely related critique is a concern with what some perceive as
an inherent conflict of interest that arises when private entities provide
public services. Others question privatization on the ground that involving
the private sector might undermine the quality-and fundamentally public
nature-of the services provided. From this arises a more abstract concern
about the risk of "hollowing out" the government with the concomitant risk
of undermining the rule of law.
On the other side of the debate, proponents of greater private
involvement primarily tout its potential benefits of enhancing the efficiency
of public services. Proponents also point to the potential that this mode of
governance has to draw on the experience and capacities of a more
pluralistic array of service providers. Public-private partnerships and
privatization more generally reflect an emerging convergence between
traditional policy goals and alternative regulatory approaches that can be
roughly grouped under the heading of "new governance." 61 This
convergence emphasizes decentralized decisionmaking, flexible "bottomup" policy solutions, and an increased role for market or private-sector
tools.

62

The debate on privatization, unresolved and perhaps irresolvable, plays
out on both instrumental and normative levels and raises empirical
questions that remain contested. 63 Whatever the ultimate merits of
arguments on both sides, 64 it is undeniable that governments at all levels are

sectors work together. Moreover, acknowledging that labels are not terms of art in this context,
as deployed in this Article, public-private partnerships also vary from traditional public

contracting in that the ultimate recipient of the relevant good or service is not the government
itself, but instead, the public.

60. See Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatizationof Social Welfare: The Case
of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 263, 269-76 (2006) (discussing the debate over
privatization).
61. See supranote 6.
62. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lanyering Community Economic Development in
the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 8, at 302, 304-07
(discussing the emergence of public-private partnerships in community economic
development as part of a larger contemporary shift toward localized, market-based governance
that leverages private resources and emphasizes community empowerment); Lobel, supra note
6, at 343 ("The legal field is at a critical moment of renewal and reinvention.").
63. See Davidson, supra note 60, at 270-71 & n.35 (discussing the empirical debate about
privatization).
64.

As Jody Freeman has argued, however, efficiency and accountability perspectives have

more in common than the at-times heated rhetoric in the debate on privatization might
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increasingly drawing on the private sector to deliver public services and that,
particularly in the arena of social-welfare policy, such engagement is firmly
65
entrenched.
The debate, however, has concrete implications for considering the role
of lawyers in public-private transactions. The fact that there is rarely a
perfect alignment of interests, even when there is a nominal commitment on
the part of private-sector entities to public goals, raises familiar principalagent problems. 66 The greater the misalignment of interests, the more
accountability is undermined, increased oversight is required, and the
greater the potential for public-private partnerships to fail. It is well beyond
the scope of this Article to resolve the myriad of challenging questions this
potential misalignment raises. From a legal-profession perspective, however,
it is important to recognize the tension that this misalignment raises for deal
lawyers. The potential misalignment of interests conversely creates an
opportunity for attorneys to manage, rather than exacerbate, such conflict.
As the spectrum discussion above makes clear, there are many contexts
in which private parties' own goals serve as mitigating influences on this
conflict. There are entities and individuals who are either motivated by the
same policy goals that animate the programs in which they engage or
programs that are structured to align public and private incentives. In the
former category, the realm of mission-driven nonprofit entities receiving
public subsidies, it is not unheard of for private parties to be even more
committed to the relevant policy goals than the agencies funding them. But
even for entities involved in regulatory bargains or more prosaic publicprivate partnerships, the structure of many modern subsidies-in housing,
energy, infrastructure, and other areas-ties private benefit to advancing the
relevant public goal. In a variety of interesting ways, this aligns the interests
of private parties who choose to seek those subsidies with the regulatory
goals of the programs in which they are engaged, directly implicating deal
lawyering.
This is not to accept, uncritically, all aspects of privatization or
public-private partnerships in particular, but simply to place the debate in
the context of making the best of what these partnerships may have to offer
through an understanding of the role of transactional lawyering in
maximizing their value. Deal lawyers in public-private partnerships have the

suggest. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1310-14 (2003) (reconciling the economic perspective on privatization with the publiclaw perspective).
65. One perennial shortcoming in the discourse on privatization is an inattention to the
particular context in which the private sector is engaging with public governance. The
privatization of military operations or prisons raises distinctly different-and in many ways more
troubling-questions about the rule of law and the problem of accountability than does the
privatization of municipal waste treatment.
66. See Davidson, supranote 60, at 276-79 (discussing agency problems in privatization).
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potential to engineer transactions to maximize the efficiency gains that
might come from engaging the private sector, minimize the accountability
costs, and ultimately-and most importantly-help all parties, including the
beneficiaries of public-private partnerships, achieve the most "valuable"
67
outcome.
IV. VALUES AND VALUE CREATION

Given the complexity of public-private transactions and the orientation
of clients toward public goals, the work-and the potential for value
creation-facing private deal lawyers differs in important ways from what is
required of their pure private-sector counterparts. Attorneys in this context
can add value not just by transaction-cost engineering or regulatory
craftsmanship, but also by serving as the critical mediating bridge between
the government and the private sector. The "value" a transactional lawyer
can create in public-private transactions thus comes through what this
Article calls regulatory translation-transmogrifying the often abstract goals of
public policy into the concrete mechanisms of private ordering.
This Part explores two primary ways in which lawyering in the
public-private context differs from lawyering in more private-oriented deals.
First, the idea of value must account for the social impact of transactions-a
more pluralistic and complex "bottom line" than typical client objectives in
the unmediated private sector. Second, while lawyers may deploy their skills
in ways that parallel both transaction-cost engineering and regulatory
craftsmanship, they must do so in ways that account for an alignment of
interests, however imperfect, between private parties and the state. This Part
then illustrates these dynamics with a discussion of affordable-housing deals
as a paradigm example.
A.

REGULATORY TRANSLATIONBYDEAL LAWYERS

Gilson's most compelling insight was that lawyers encountering barriers
to reaching agreements can craft practical solutions from the ordinary dross

67. In the context of programs that ameliorate conditions that might generate demand
for broader social change, it is a well-founded critique of lawyering that the potential exists for
such lawyering to undermine the very causes it seeks to serve. Cf Scott L. Cummings, Community
Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54
STAN. L. REv. 399, 455-56 (2001) (discussing the limitations of community economic
development to "challenge the structural determinants of poverty" and the risk that such local
work "diminishes the importance of large-scale, coordinated social change strategies"). How
one responds to this concern has much to do with how one evaluates the potential likelihood of
fundamental, rather than incremental, social change and the advantages and disadvantages of
serving communities in need regardless of the pace (or, in recent decades, direction) of that
change. These are difficult questions and are beyond the scope of this Article. For now, it must
suffice to recognize that governments at all levels are investing resources-inadequate by most
lights, but hardly trivial-in engaging the private sector to serve those in need, and that model
of social welfare is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
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of contractual language to bridge mistrust, mitigate information failures,
and otherwise solve problems the parties themselves may not have perceived.
In the public-private context, lawyers also apply these transactionalengineering techniques, but do so to deal with variables that are uncommon
in the purely private arena. In particular, they apply these tools to solve a
different set of potential failures that arise from regulatory complexity, the
opaqueness of public policy, and tensions between public goals and private
ordering.
1. Public Policy and the Provision of Public Goods
as Transactional Variables
Public-private partnerships involve objectives that might be very
difficult to commodify in traditional market terms or that might run counter
to what would otherwise inform a market term for the asset in question. If
transaction-cost engineering is an exercise in moving a deal closer to
hypothetical perfect market conditions, then changing the predicate goal
from market benchmarks to a deal orientation that is shaped by the
interaction of market forces and public policy correspondingly changes the
role of the lawyer in adding value. The mechanics of the task may be similar,
with lawyers identifying opportunities and challenges from the differential
information and expectations of the parties. But in public-private
transactions, those differences reflect potential transactional failures arising
from the mismatch between the different sectors from which the partners
approach the transaction.
Primary elements of any public-private partnership that bear on the
work of deal lawyers are the centrality of public policy as a transactional
variable, the way public subsidies change private risk profiles, and the
consequences that flow from having the public as the ultimate beneficiary of
the deal. These factors fracture the vision of the end-product of deal work as
value in the sole sense of a clients' financial gain and necessitate unpacking
in greater detail.
a.

Non-Market and Counter-Market TransactionalObjectives

Many, if not most, public-private partnerships take place in the shadow
of clear market failure. Scholars tend to think of market failure as a
rationale (or, for some, the rationale) for regulation, 68 but market failure
can also give rise to incentive programs and regulatory bargains. Thus, the
public sector incentivizes the private sector to produce, in public-private
partnerships, exactly those goods and services that the market itself is not
producing or cannot produce-below-market-rate rental housing, for

68. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982) (discussing rationales
for regulation and comparing market-failure versus non-market-failure justifications).
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example, or the preservation of open space in the midst of urban density. 69
Public goods may have private analogues, and the line between public and
private is never easy to draw, but the structure of deals that involve public
subsidies or regulatory bargains will tend to place objectives in the mix that
run counter to market forces.
Moreover, beyond intervening where markets have failed, many publicprivate transactions encourage the private sector to achieve ends that are
notably-and appropriately-largely outside the ordinary market.
Redistribution, for example, is an aspect of many social services, as is
maintaining a social safety net for vulnerable populations. Some goals at the
heart of public-private partnerships are even further removed from the
traditional realm of private transacting. As noted, this might involve
environmental protection, alternative energy, public safety, or even more
abstract policy objectives like community involvement or family stability.
Again, this is not to argue that even the most abstract policy goal cannot be
monetized, although it is reasonable to question whether doing so is
appropriate in many areas of policy.70 It is rather to recognize that publicprivate partnerships put market actors into contexts traditionally defined by
non-market mechanisms and transfers.
"Value" thus takes on a much broader meaning in public-private
partnerships than simply maximizing a transaction's overall return. Value in
even the most mundane private deal can include more than lowering direct
and indirect costs and can even, as Steven Schwarcz has speculated, arise
through intangibles such as increased client confidence and reduced client
anxiety. 71 But in public-private partnerships, there are inevitably multiple
values and multiple ways of considering value. Private attorneys face the task
of translating those variables into concrete mechanisms through which
private parties can allocate their risks and order their relationships.
b.

Altered Risk Profiles

A second factor in many public-private transactions is that the presence
of public subsidies alters private parties' risk profiles. Risk is inevitable in any
deal and is factored into the return in any well-structured transaction. Many
elements of typical subsidy programs, however, seek to minimize the
possibility of failure and maximize the long-term stability of the public

69.

Defining "public goods" in terms that are consistent with traditional economic

understandings can be a challenging task, see, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 49-50 (1968), but it is not necessary to delve into that conundrum to
recognize that there are categories of goods and services that the government either directly
provides or incentivizes the private sector to provide. See DONAHUE, supra note 52, at 7 fig.1.1
(discussing the variables that inform the matrix of public provision and public payment for
public goods).

70.
71.

See supra note 7.
Schwarcz, Explaining,supra note 1, at 489.
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benefit. Some subsidies are explicitly designed to serve this insurance
function, but a secondary consequence of many other public interventions is
that the government becomes invested in the outcome of private transacting
in a way that makes failure less acceptable.
Public investment in this context thus means that certain risks become
less acceptable or must be managed differently than in purely private
transactions. Accordingly, deal lawyers must translate that fact into
mechanisms for ensuring the long-term viability of projects-and ideallythe long-term commitment on the part of the government to support that
viability. Some scholars have criticized this aspect of the public provision of
goods and services, decrying a lack of market discipline and the perception
that buffering public-service providers from the creative destruction of the
market undermines efficiency. 72 However, there is a strong argument that
many public goods and services are defined by their very insularity from
market risk, which may in fact be an advantage of public investment in
private transactions, bringing stability and appropriate buffering to
otherwise unmediated market forces. Regardless, it remains a reality that the
general public has a low tolerance for allowing the fruits of public
investment to be subject to ordinary market risks.
c.

The Public as Beneficiaries

A third notable feature of public-private partnerships is the role of the
public as the recipient of the particular good or service-whether in social
services, infrastructure, public safety, or any of the myriad other areas of
public-private engagement. Although many market transactions take place
in the shadow of the consumer, in public-private partnerships, the public, as
the beneficiary of the final product, brings stakeholders to the table and
adds political considerations to the mix. These stakeholders and
considerations, in turn, shape the expectations and risk allocations of the
participants.
The final recipients of public benefits are rarely directly represented in
public-private transactions. 73 This can be for pragmatic reasonsbeneficiaries may be the public in some diffused sense, for example in the
environmental-protection context, or specific beneficiaries may not be
identified until a project is complete. There are proxies, however, that bear

72.

See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

111-12 (2000)

(discussing the reasons for dissatisfaction and recurrent problems with government activities);
see also DONAHUE, supra note 52, at 51 (comparing the attenuation of ownership in public

undertakings to the more concentrated organization of private companies).
73. This representational problem, and the broader problem of engaging diverse
stakeholders, remains a point of vulnerability for new governance. See Lisa T. Alexander,
Stakeholder Participationin New Governance: Lessons from Chicago'sPublic Housing Reform Experiment,

17 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY (forthcoming 2009) (discussing new governance's effect on
public and private collaboration).
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directly on transactional structure. Thus, for example, the basic incentive
structure the government creates may serve as that proxy-if this structure
produces more alternative energy or affordable housing, the general,
undifferentiated interests of the public represented in the government's
policies are served. However, there may be more specific mechanisms that
bring recipient interests into a deal, such as enforcement mechanisms,
explicit third-party rights, and proxy representation through community
74
groups, advocates, or others.
Because public involvement in public-private partnerships tends to
raise political considerations, lawyers must structure deals to moderate the
impact of such considerations. 75 Politics-in this context manifested
primarily as the potential that a program may change for reasons not
endogenous to the program itself-as a transactional variable raises
uncertainty not entirely unlike other areas of uncertainty, and can be
amenable to explicit risk allocation. In this situation, there is potential for
Gilson-like value creation in that deals that might collapse for fear of
political change or that might give rise to inefficient hedging in the face of
potential change can go forward through the kinds of risk-allocation
76
mechanisms that private lawyers deploy in any number of other contexts.

74. Were recipients more often directly represented in public-private transactions, it
might bring into sharper focus the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries. Id. However, there is
not always going to be a perfect alignment of interests between the "public," represented by
public-policy tradeoffs instantiated in any given program design, and the specific members of
the public to whom a program is directed. For example, a low-income tenant may disagree with
what a sponsoring agency thinks is the best way to approach tenure or subsidy issues. Discerning
the appropriate line between recipient involvement and policy discretion is a recurring
concern.

75. This is not to argue that political considerations-a category of interests that are hard
to define-are inherently illegitimate or inappropriate to factor into the implementation of
public subsidy programs. There are positive and negative aspects to factoring in public
participation, and it is hard in many situations to separate beneficial involvement from naked
rent seeking. The practical problem, however, is how to translate the potential for policy
changes into a long-term set of mutual obligations. Conversely, accountability on the part of the
provider is equally fundamental.
Politics are manifest in public-private partnerships in more clearly negative wayssteering contracts to personal contacts or other types of outright corruption, for example.
Officials wisely managing subsidy programs can, in a variety of ways, attempt to insulate their
programs from this kind of political interference, but the risks such involvement poses are
hardly trivial.
76. Parties can allocate political risk as they allocate any other risk. To preview the
example of affordable housing that this Article discusses in detail below, see infra Part IV.B.2
(presenting the affordable-housing example), investors in Low Income Housing Tax Credit
transactions can and do bargain for guarantees relating to issues like the nonrenewal of
particular subsidies. See Oversight of HUD and Its Fiscal Year 2009 Budget: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affiars, 100th Cong. (2008) (statement of Hector Pinero,

Related Management Company), excerpted at http://www.taxcreditcoalition.org/uploads/
post-pdfs/BackgroundofSect_8_Shortfall.pdf (discussing non-renewal risk that investors face
in developments with project-based Section 8 subsidies).
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Tools and Tasks

To turn from deal variables to structuring tools, private lawyers, as a
practical matter, can deploy a variety of mechanisms to translate policy
goals-both abstract and concrete-into the terms of private contract: risk
allocation, information management, and the basic structures of reciprocal
obligation over time. Private lawyers deploy these tools, however, to solve
different kinds of information-cost and expectation-related failures than
those found in private-sector deals with no state involvement.
a.

CooperativeBargainingin the Shadow of the State

In public-private partnerships, conflicts between private incentives and
public goals are inevitable, 77 as conflicts arise in any transactional
environment. However, just as lawyers can orient their approach toward
dealmaking to emphasize the potential for value creation in what Gilson
called cooperative bargaining, 78 transactional lawyers in public-private
transactions can add value by anticipating such conflicts and structuring the
framework of the parties' interaction to emphasize the alignment of
interests over points of conflict. The potential for such structuring in publicprivate partnerships is at least as pervasive as in purely private-sector deals,
although the involvement of the state and the public generally can make
aligning long-term interests particularly challenging.
Strategic behavior in this context arises not only from the traditional
grounds for gamesmanship in dealmaking but also from factors endemic to
public-private partnerships, such as the potential volatility of public policy
and the opaqueness of regulatory requirements. Each of these grounds for
potential strategic behavior, pace Gilson, carries with it a concomitant
opportunity for value creation, as deal lawyers build information and
reputational mechanisms into deal structure and allocate risks to facilitate
cooperative orientation toward policy goals.
b.

Layers of Translationin Practice

As attorneys structure deals to take into account various public
programs, the tasks they undertake that are unique to the nature of publicprivate partnerships range from the straightforward to the more creative.
Perhaps most straightforward is the basic work of identifying regulatory
requirements and ensuring that those requirements are met. This is akin to
traditional compliance work, although as discussed below, 79 differences arise
due to client orientation or incentives related to the underlying regulatory
goals at issue.

77.
78.
79.

See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
Gilson, supranote 1, at 282 n.109.
See infra Part IV.A.2.d.
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Deal lawyers engaged in regulatory translation, however, can add value
in the interstices of regulatory ambiguity, finding creative ways to advance
what are often poorly articulated policy goals. 80 If a program calls for a hard
output-X number of medical procedures provided to the public or Y
megawatts of renewable energy generated-there may be little room to vary
the underlying goal, but even in that context, there are likely to be any
number of micro-level structuring decisions that go into reaching that goal.
Thus, even where there is significant overlap in orientation between private
parties and public goals at a macro level, there may be conflicts to manage
81
in implementation.
Even more creativity and potential for adding value arises where
attorneys take on the entrepreneurial role of structuring a program beyond
the narrow goal of meeting regulatory requirements. This is akin to what
private lawyers do when they act as matchmakers and proselytizers in
business.8 2 Here, however, the entrepreneurship relates to public policy and
not business innovation, although in public-private partnerships there is
considerable potential for overlap between the two. Thus, lawyers not only
represent clients in individual deals, but also help to advocate for policy
changes, form organizations to advance relevant policy, and build on their
83
deal experience to feed back into program-system design.
c.

ManagingRegulatoiy Complexity

The ubiquity of regulation is an aspect of the modern administrative
state that has an impact across the spectrum of transactional law. The
government is far from a unitary entity, and any given transaction may
unfold subject to environmental, securities, antitrust, consumer-protection,
and other regulatory regimes, not to mention more specialized regulation
that can include everything from local land use to the alphabet soup of
84
industry- or sector-specific federal agencies.

80. Regulatory translation can take place regardless of the "subjective" orientation of the
client to the relevant policy goals. See supra Part III.A. However, where a client is neutral with
respect to the goal of institutional motivation, the incentives for attorney creativity or
structuring to go beyond minimal conformity to public-law strictures may be muted.
81.
Moreover, it is not uncommon for individual transactions to have multiple private
parties who do not share a common outlook on the given program involved. See infra Part P.B.

This can give rise to an additional "translation" task for lawyers in mediating not only between
the private sector and the state but also between mission-driven entities and more economically
oriented entities involved in a deal.
82. See Bernstein, Silicon Valley, supra note 1, at 245-51 (discussing the role that lawyers
play in venture-capital-financing transactions).
83. On balance, this kind of policy-innovation role is likely ultimately a positive
contribution for lawyers, but there are grounds for some caution. See infra Part V.
84. See Fleischer, supra note 36 (manuscript at 25-27) (discussing the state's involvement
in transactional deals).
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However, this fragmentation of the government takes on even more
transactional importance in public-private partnerships, where one
regulatory program-say, a tax incentive-may not fit well or at all with
another applicable program. As Michael Diamond argued, regulatory goals
often clash and can be incommensurate in their details-what Diamond
called competing goods. 85 Diamond focused on housing policy, but this is a
practical problem that stretches across many public-private transactions.
Thus, a federal agency may be promoting alternative energy by subsidizing
wind farms while a state wildlife agency has to respond to the impact this
might have on migratory birds and a county might have to approve the siting
and layout of the project.
Where private lawyers in the compliance context may have a
comparative market advantage in managing this regulatory complexity, 86 it is
a much more essential element of regulatory translation to add value by
solving the practical problems that these regulatory overlaps create. It is the
responsibility of the private party involved, ultimately, to manage potentially
conflicting regulatory regimes. The lawyer is the indispensible party in that
87
process.
d.

Craftsmanship and Compliance Compared

Returning to the alignments-of-interests spectrum, 88 regulatory
translation can be contrasted with two distinct aspects of transactional
interaction with public law. First, business lawyers regularly undertake
regulatory compliance, both in deals and in the ordinary course of
counseling their clients. 8 9 Compliance focuses on ensuring that regulated
85.

See generally Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing and the Conflict of Competing Goods: A

Policy Dilemma, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS (forthcoming

2009) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (discussing the conflict between different housing
goals).
86. See Fleischer, supra note 36 (manuscript at 5) (discussing law firm market advantage in
managing regulatory complexity).
87. It bears noting that transactional complexity is not only a function of the bureaucratic
(in a neutral sense of the word) tendencies of the administrative state, but also it arises from the
increasing sophistication of clients and the multiple constituencies involved in most modem
deals. The vision of transactional law as the realm of two parties sitting across the negotiating
table hardly describes deals that may involve constituencies as varied as regulators, unions,
lenders, consumer groups, customers, and others. Recognizing that complexity raises its own
transaction costs allows an extension of Gilson's analysis to the value that can come from
managing that complexity. This is not a skill that is inherent to lawyers, of course. Other
professionals have more direct training in management, but there is something in the
"quarterbacking" of deals that gives attorneys a comparative advantage in finding the value of
managing complexity. See id. (manuscript at 29-31) (discussing the role of "quarterbacking"
deals).
88. See supra Part III.A.
89. See Dent, supra note 1, at 297-98 (discussing non-transactional business-related legal
work); cf. David Dana, Environmental Lawyers and the Public Service Model of Lauyering, 74 OR. L.
REV. 57, 70-77 (1995) (exploring conflicts inherent in responding to regulatory demands).
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entities operate within regulatory constraints-familiar work not only for
environmental or securities lawyers, but almost all business lawyers in the
modern context.
The primary difference between this compliance work and the work of
regulatory translation that this Article describes is the orientation of the
project and of the client. The essential task of compliance work is to find the
most efficient avenue to meet the minimal requirements set by law. There
might be incentives for regulated entities to go beyond those minimal
requirements, for example, to signal customers, to build regulatory goodwill,
or to repair reputational problems. 90 However, those motivations are not at
the core of how most regulated industries respond to regulatory
requirements, and for traditional profit-motivated industries, likely
represent lost value.
Regulatory translation likewise differs from regulatory arbitrage,
primarily in terms of the alignment of interests and the goals that the parties
seek to achieve. Where private entities are seeking to advance the public
goals of whatever program in which they are engaged, there is less of an
inherent conflict between the requirements of public policy and the private
value of a transaction-and there may be a real alignment between the value
the private client is seeking and dictates of public policy.
On one level, regulatory translation draws upon the same skill set and
insights as compliance and regulatory craftsmanship. Lawyers in each of
these roles engage with the complex strictures imposed by public law and
have to understand how various regulatory frictions affect deal structure and
their clients' goals. The difference in the regulatory translation context is
the baseline assumption of regulatory stricture as friction. Put simply, where
a client's interests are aligned (however imperfectly) with public goals, a
regulatory framework provides a potential source of value creation in an
affirmative sense. The deal lawyer's engineering task is not to minimize the
costs associated with regulation, but rather to maximize the public benefits
associated with the relevant program.
In the end, this is not to suggest that the model of regulatory translation
this Article identifies is inherently limited to public-private transactions.
Skilled attorneys in regulated environments almost always mediate between
their clients and the state. The critical difference-a difference perhaps in
degree more than in kind-is that, in public-private deals, that mediation
takes place in a transactional setting where the kind of engineering that
Gilson identified can be applied to enhance "value" in a way that advances
policy goals as well as financial gain.

90.

Dana, supra note 89, at 75 (discussing signaling to regulatory agencies); cf. Victor

Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The BrandingEffect of CorporateDeal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581,

1628-37 (2006) (analyzing the consumer-signaling effect of corporate deal structures).
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TESTING VALUE CREATION: THE LIMITS OFEMPIRJCISM
AND ALTERNATIVE METRICS

To give some concrete grounding to this relatively abstract discussion,
affordable housing offers a fruitful paradigm of public-private
partnerships. 9 1 This Part thus outlines the characteristics of typical
affordable-housing deals as they relate to value creation by deal lawyers and
then tackles the challenges of demonstrating that value creation empirically.
1. Affordable-Housing Deals as Paradigm Examples
On the supply side, governments at all levels have engaged the private
sector to develop and operate housing that is affordable at below-marketrate rents or that is available for sale on an income-restricted basis. 92 Various
public agencies, at all levels of government, dedicate tens of billions of
dollars in direct and indirect subsidies to the development and preservation
of affordable housing every year, 93 and the stock of privately owned, publicly
subsidized housing in the United States currently stands at more than two
million units.

94

Affordable-housing deals resemble traditional private real-estate
transactions in many respects, but the requirements attached to the public
subsidies involved introduce some notable complications. In housing, policy
goals include not just providing safe and decent below-market-rate shelter,
which would be challenging enough, but also giving residents voice and
stability, providing a locus for other social services, creating economic

91.
Cf Tim Iglesias, Our PluralistHousing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 511, 589 (2007) (describing the "progressive" vision of affordable housing).
Affordable housing shares some characteristics with other areas of public-private partnerships,
including urban renewal and infrastructure, as well as other areas of social-welfare policy.
Housing, however, is a particularly fruitful area on which to focus given the heavily-transactionoriented nature of the practice. Any example drawn from the world of social-welfare policy is
likely to have some disconnection with examples from areas not as explicitly directed toward
ameliorating poverty. From a functional lawyering perspective, these differences are generally
going to be questions of emphasis and degree, rather than of kind.
92. Affordable housing is subsidized on the supply side directly through grants and loans
and other subsidies and indirectly through the tax code; on the demand side, housing is
typically subsidized through vouchers. The kinds of affordable-housing transactions this Article
examines primarily involve supply-side subsidies.
93. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY 2007 BUDGET SUMMARY 13-16 (2007),
available at http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy07/fyO7budget.pdf (outlining the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development's discretionary spending by program for
2005, 2006, and 2007); Novogradac & Co., Affordable Hous. Res. Ctr., Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit: 2007 Federal Tax Credit Information by State, http://www.novoco.com/
lowincome-housing/lihtc/federal-lihtc_2007.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (listing the
allocation of low-income-housing tax credits by state for 2007).
94.

MILLENNIAL HoUs. COMM'N, MEETING OUR NATION'S HOUSING CHALLENGES 25

(2002).
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opportunity, and mitigating
the impacts of the concentration of poverty,
95
among other objectives.
Just as in traditional real estate, affordable-housing deals generally
involve the development of a new building or the acquisition of an existing
asset, and the bulk of contemporary programs, at least at the national level,
focus on multifamily rental projects. 96 The players are familiar as well-they
include the owner of land or the existing project, the developer or acquirer,
and the web of financial participants on the debt and equity sides.
It is in the category of financial participation that the public side of the
public-private partnership enters most clearly. In housing partnerships, it is
the private sector that develops, owns, and operates the housing, but at least
some portion of the financing is public. Subsidies can take the form of
grants or loans, waivers of fee requirements and other soft subsidies, or,
increasingly, through the indirect subsidy of tax credits for equity investors
in Low Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC") transactions. 97 Affordablehousing projects today almost always require multiple subsidies, and the
further down the income scale (and hence less able to support operating
costs) the target population the subsidy is to serve, the greater the number
of subsidy streams generally required. Each subsidy stream comes with its
own particular goals-in terms of development structure, clientele to be
served, time horizon, and other variables-and particular set of generally
highly detailed regulations and related requirements. Add subsidy streams
from local, state, and federal agencies, and the complications and required
coordination correspondingly multiply.
Just as the basic affordable-housing transaction is more than a
particularly complex real-estate deal, the private entities-both for-profit
and nonprofit-that get involved in this sector of the housing market can
have notably different characteristics than traditional businesses. To return
to the spectrum of the alignment of public and private interests, 98
participants in typical affordable-housing transactions range from mission95.
See generally ALEX F. SCHWARTZ,
INTRODUCTION (2006).

HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN

96. Single-family housing, particularly on the for-sale side, is also a part of affordablehousing policy; however, despite the veneration of this sector of the market by policymakers,
homeownership is untenable for many of those served by core affordable-housing programs.
Accordingly, the core of affordable-housing policy focuses more on rental housing.
97. For good overviews of various subsidy mechanisms at all levels of government, see
generally RickJudd & Barbara E. Kautz, Local Government FinancingPowers and Sources of Funding,
in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 287, 287-328 (Tim Iglesias &
Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005) (discussing local governments' authority in relation to funding);
Rochelle E. Lento, Federal Sources of Financing, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 215, 215-58 (discussing the different sources of federal funding
available); Peter Salsich, State Sources of Housing Finance, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE
HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 259, 259-86 (discussing states' involvement in providing
funding for low-income residents).
98.

See supra Part III.A.
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driven nonprofit developers deeply committed to the essential public goals
at stake to investors largely indifferent to anything but the economic returns
represented by the subsidy. 99 To use a phrase that is common in housing
deals, the "brain damage"-the level of complexity one must overcome and
master for any given outcome-is great and the margins often thin, so
participants justify involvement in this arena for reasons of goal orientation,
to exploit a market niche, or some combination thereof.
Private parties involved in housing illustrate this variety of goal
orientation. At one end, for example, certain LIHTC investors seek the
credits purely for the economic advantage (a dollar-for-dollar income-tax
reduction) that the program offers, and are entirely indifferent to the use of
their equity funds, except from a compliance perspective. As with many
housing programs, the government-created incentive structure aligns-or is
at least designed to align-the transactional goals of the private entities and
the relevant public policies. Thus, for LIHTC investors, despite their
possible indifference to affordable-housing policy, ensuring that such
housing is built and operated by the private developers according to the
strictures of the program is critical to achieving the economic goals driving the
investors. The rules are created by legislation and regulation, and investors'
returns are driven by ensuring compliance with those rules.
At the other end of the spectrum are the myriad nonprofit housing
providers whose mission is to provide affordable housing and often related
services. These entities range from the smallest community-based church
group with a handful of units to sophisticated national nonprofit entities
that have emerged in the past two decades to manage portfolios in the
thousands of units. For all of these entities-even largely indifferent
investors-the "deal" involves more than simply the economics, and the
threshold decision to participate in any public-private partnership reflects at
least some understanding of the public goals involved. 100

99. It is open to question the extent to which any private entity, at least in the for-profit
arena, is driven purely by economic considerations, but it is hard to deny that economic
considerations constitute the predominant (if not overriding) organizing principles for most
for-profit entities.
100. Another variable in client orientation can be reluctant participation, which arises
primarily in the context of regulatory bargains. Inclusionary zoning is a good example of this.
In inclusionary zoning, a regulatory benefit-typically some development permission-is
granted in exchange for the inclusion of affordable housing in the project or fees in lieu of
such dedications. One can compare an affordable-housing development by a nonprofit
provider to inclusionary zoning. In the former case, a mission-driven entity calls on public
subsidies to create a new asset that directly advances the goal of providing shelter for those
unable to afford market-rate housing. In the latter case, the same number of units of housing
may be created, serving the exact same recipients, but the orientation of the provider is
different: private developers tend to view inclusionary housing (and any number of other public
benefits granted in exchange for development rights) as transaction costs in the purest sense.
Thus, the physical product may look the same in each deal, but the orientation of the
transaction-and the role of the lawyer-may take on a different cast.
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Affordable-housing deals illustrate that goal orientation is complex and
one need not assume any particular normative perspective on the relevant
public purposes to identify an alignment of interests. The critical point is
that such an alignment may occur regardless of the "subjective" orientation
of the individuals behind the entities involved. In that situation, although a
deal may be entirely between two (or more) private parties, the deal lawyer
representing any given party has an additional realm in which to perform
the kind of engineering that Gilson identified. For Gilson, the value added
by deal lawyers centers on bridging information gaps and other barriers to
transacting, and the same role can be played in adding value for parties
whose transactional goals include advancing public policies.
2.

Traces of Value Creation in Public-Private Transactions

The example of affordable housing provides a framework within which
to respond to a perennial challenge in the transactional-lawyering literature.
That challenge is demonstrating that deal lawyers do, in fact, engineer
transaction and regulatory costs in ways that enhance the overall value of the
transaction. It is difficult, if not impossible, of course, to prove the value that
transactional lawyers add (can you imagine the control group?).10 1
Steven Schwarcz has attempted to tackle this problem through surveys
of attorneys and their clients. Schwarcz asked not whether lawyers add value,
but rather if they do, in what way. Schwarcz parses the theoretical grounds
for transactional lawyers to create value by minimizing the risk of postcontracting litigation, providing reputational intermediation, and providing
client privilege and confidentiality as distinct ways of understanding value
creation in addition to the transaction-cost and regulatory-arbitrage grounds
identified by Gilson and Fleischer. 10 2 Schwarcz's findings are revealing about
attorney and client attitudes toward the value that lawyers provide, 10 3 but
there are limitations to an empirical approach to value creation that relies
on opinion data. It may be that perceptions of value creation and actual
value creation align, but it is also possible that there is a missing theoretical
understanding of attorney role identity and work that undermines such
perceptions.
Gilson offered both a more direct and, on some level, more anecdotal
solution to this empirical challenge, pointing out that at least some evidence
of the dynamics of value creation that he hypothesized is discernable in

101. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 247-48 (discussing measurement problems in assessing
lawyer value creation).
102. Schwarcz, Explaining,supra note 1, at 491.
103. For example, Schwarcz finds that lawyers and clients regard minimizing ex post
litigation as a primary goal for deal lawyers, i&i at 496, that there is only weak support for
Gilson's vision of transaction-cost engineering, id. at 498, and that there is strong support for
value creation through the reduction of regulatory costs, id. at 500.
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actual deal documents. 10 4 Gilson thus highlighted a number of examples
in a typical asset-purchase agreement that demonstrated how lawyers
in practice engineer transaction costs, citing earnout provisions,
representations, warranties, indemnifications, and legal opinions as tools to
manage expectations and information costs.

10 5

This latter approach may be

10 6
a more productive approach, although it is not perfect.
Just as Gilson sought evidence of value creation in the interstices of
standard asset-purchase documents, so regulatory translation can be seen to
play out in the ordinary language of the deal documents that frame publicprivate transactions. 10 7 To return to the paradigm of housing as a concrete
case study, and in particular tax-credit transactions, one can see evidence of
regulatory translation in some of the more common provisions of many
affordable-housing deals. For typical clients, these provisions involve
translating what can often be difficult and, in the context of multiple subsidy
streams, conflicting regulatory requirements into obligations that are
understandable and that can be framed in terms of the allocation of risk
between the parties.

a. Tax-Credit Recapture Guaranteesas Time-Horizon
and Regulatory BalancingTools
Federal law structures the LIHTC program to place on investors over a
period of fifteen years the risk that the project will not meet regulatory
requirements. If the project falls out of compliance, or the Internal Revenue
Service discovers a prior noncompliance, investors face recapture of tax
benefits by the IRS plus interest-a potentially draconian penalty. 10 8 In
104. Gilson began with the proposition that the persistence of business lawyering is some
indication that lawyers add value. Mark Suchman has challenged this predicate assumption,
arguing that the persistent centrality of deal lawyers is at least as consistent with "its taken-forgrantedness, normative endorsement and ritualization" that might "reflect a local equilibrium
that might be resistant to change, but not be globally optimal." Suchman, supra note 16, at 27273. These are valuable nuances to add to Gilson's framework, but they are not necessarily
inconsistent with the proposition that deal lawyers nonetheless may be worth, at least some of
the time, what they command in the market.
105. See generally Gilson, supra note 1, at 256-93 (analyzing a typical acquisition agreement
and the role that business lawyers play in creating value in such transactions); supra Part II.A
(discussing Gilson's examples).
106. Fleischer takes a third tack, pointing to deal structures, firm self-reporting of value,
and qualitative data in the form of attorney interviews to undergird his argument. See supra Part
II.B.
107. It is important as well to acknowledge that attempting to discern traces of value
creation, however defined, in the residue of deal structures risks ignoring the larger context in
which transactions occur. Lisa Bernstein has argued that beyond "the terms of the parties'
written agreements," certain transactional contexts, such as Silicon Valley, may allow for value
creation through roles other than transactional engineer. Bernstein, Silicon Valley, supra note 1,
at 253. Context is obviously equally important for the specialized pra'tice areas in which publicprivate partnerships take place.
108. SeeI.R.C. § 42(0) (2000).
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practice, however, investors tend to be passive participants in partnerships or
limited liability companies controlled by developers who are responsible for
the day-to-day activities (such as certifying the income level of tenants)
required to maintain regulatory compliance.
In LIHTC deals, therefore, it is typical to see elaborate provisions for
guarantee payments by developers to investors in the case of recapture or
similar adverse tax events. These provisions manage the differential horizon
and incentives facing tax-credit investors (often passive entities with little
interest in actively intervening over the life of a project), tax-credit
developers, and owners. These provisions also creatively solve an element of
uncertainty arising from the potential for policy changes.
However, the IRS has suggested constraints on nonprofit developers'
ability to offer strong indemnities to for-profit investors, even when the
nonprofit developers are in the service of providing affordable housing, an
acceptable charitable mission. 10 9 This directly raises an example of
Diamond's competing goods-the imperatives of prudent nonprofit
governance on the one hand clashing with a subsidy structure predicated on
private-investor return on the other. Deal lawyers have had to structure
around this clash.
One common resulting structure caps the exposure of the nonprofit
developer to the economic value coming from the deal-translating the
developer fee, in essence, into a source for investor protection. This gives
investors some protection and aligns the interests of the developer and
investor over the period of risk while protecting the ongoing viability of the
nonprofit entity. This kind of creative structure bears a family resemblance
to the kinds of mechanisms that Gilson highlighted as solving
heterogeneous-expectation problems in private transactions, but deal
lawyers in the housing context must mold those solutions to the realities of
the programs at issue.
b. Accountingfor Accountability
Also typical in housing deals are provisions that require notification of
the government and governmental approval at key turning points in the life
of a project, reserve regulatory authority to the government, or impose
relatively open-ended "quality" standards on the housing. 110 Oversight
mechanisms balance private flexibility with the need to protect the core
public benefit at issue, both in terms of maintaining affordability but also in
terms of preserving the physical asset itself. Quality or similar open-ended
109.

See Roberta L. Rubin & Jonathan Klein, Nonprofit Guaranties in Tax Credit Transactions:

A New Era?, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 314, 318 (2006) (discussing an

internal IRS memorandum that set forth criteria for evaluating a tax-exempt organization's
involvement in a LIHTC transaction).
110. See Davidson, supra note 60, at 288-93 (discussing contractual provisions in affordablehousing transactions).
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obligations on the nature of management recognize the risk of opportunism
and, at the same time, acknowledge the challenge of specifying with any
level of detail the variety and complexity of obligations that housing deals
can entail.
Returning to the issue of risk profiles, from the government's
perspective, one distinctive element of housing as a public-private product
is the relatively durable nature of the asset involved. When a public subsidy
incentivizes the private sector to generate affordable housing or to convert a
housing asset previously serving market-rate tenants, the time-horizon of the
public commitment is measured in decades, if not longer. This can be true
of public-private partnerships in the infrastructure arena and other
examples involving hard assets, but is generally less true compared to other
areas of social welfare. This extended public commitment, which has proven
controversial for private providers at times, 111 creates incentives and
practical problems that intertwine the government and the private sector
into long-term, on-going interactions that have to be understood-and
accounted for in deal structuring-from the outset.
c.

AllocatingforPoliticalRisk

As noted, deal lawyers have to structure to account for the possibility
that political priorities change over time and that programmatic
requirements correspondingly shift. One example of this in the housing
context is the problem of so-called appropriation risk. Often an important
aspect of the financial viability of a given development is a form of projectbased rental subsidy. However, project-based Section 8 subsidies, a common
form of operating assistance for housing, are typically limited by the
proposition that Congress must appropriate funds for the subsidy on an
annual basis. Congress has never failed to renew the subsidy, but the risk
nonetheless exists that an important aspect of the financial viability of a
project rests on political grounds. Lawyers manage this risk-again a
question of heterogeneous information and expectation between public and
private actors-by a variety of means, including guarantees and
indemnifications, salvaging transactions, and adding value through
regulatory translation.

111. A notable area of recent policy development and litigation involves the problem of
time-limited affordability requirements. Many housing programs make an explicit bargain with
the private sector: utilize public subsidies to develop housing that will be below market for a
period of time-thirty years, for example, in many LIHTC transactions-at which point you will
be able to take the building to market-rate housing. Congress and HUD have attempted, in a
variety of ways, to mitigate the impact of this initial bargain (with owners resisting some of these
attempts), and ever-longer affordability periods are becoming common, but this remains a
controversial aspect of contemporary housing policy.
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d. Responding to Third-PartyInterests
Finally, housing transactions often feature provisions that cover thirdparty rights, primarily for tenants. These provisions can include everything
from basic tenancy protection--defining when and under what conditions
owners can cease renting to tenants-to tenant organizational rights to
certain option rights or rights of first refusal. Functionally, these third-party
rights can be understood as mechanisms to define the obligations of owners
in a way that balances their expectations with the need for tenant
involvement and security. From a value-creation perspective, however, these
kinds of provisions highlight the challenges (and opportunities) for deal
structuring raised by what is essentially proxy representation for the ultimate
recipients of the projects created.
These examples by no means exhaust the universe of provisions in
housing deals that set forth a framework and the terms of engagement for
long-term, public-private interactions, but they do give a concrete sampling
of regulatory translation in action. Each of these typical provisions, in the
end, represents a solution to a potential transacting barrier to the various
public and private interests involved in reaching an outcome that is not only
mutually beneficial, but advances the relevant regulatory goals. Because
lawyers are capable of rendering these interests in the terms of private
agreement, even with provisions that are, at times, open ended, they create
deals and make them more "valuable" in the broadest sense of the word.
V. THE PROBLEMATICS OF REGULATORY TRANSLATION:
ATTORNEY ROLES AND INHERENT CONFLICTS

To this point, the discussion of the lawyer's role in public-private
partnerships has largely staked out a descriptive claim that attorneys serving
clients involved in public programs who are in some alignment with the
goals of those programs can serve an important role in translating that
policy into private agreement. As noted, there is a basic empirical question
underlying that descriptive claim: Does the work of regulatory translation
create value in the way this Article theorizes? It is impossible to resolve this
question definitively, although traces of this value creation in examples of
112
public-private transactions can be found in practice.
At this juncture, however, this descriptive claim also raises the
normative question whether lawyers should act as translators in this way, or
whether they should approach their role uniformly regardless of the
context. Moreover, there are negative, as well as positive, consequences that

112. It is also fair to ask the predicate empirical question whether deal lawyers in publicprivate transactions act in the way this Article outlines. On this, again it would be difficult to
evaluate in any depth, but it is safe to hazard a tentative claim that lawyers, at least some of the
time, embrace that role, although there is value in doing so more self-consciously, as the Article
discusses below. See infra Part VI.A.
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might flow from relying on the private bar to act in this public-regarding
capacity. This Part explores both concerns.
A.

DIFFERENIATINGATrORNEY ROLES

A well-rehearsed general tension runs through the discourse on legal
ethics and lawyering between prevailing models of zealous advocacy and
alternative visions of attorney identity that would impose independent
ethical or moral duties beyond client goals. 113 This raises what Katherine
Kruse describes as "the gap between what is legally permitted and what is
just."11 4 Scholars, thus, periodically extol the potential for lawyers to act as
statesmen 115 and leaders, 116 with a concomitant responsibility for acting in
the public interest. Just as regularly, scholars counter with arguments for the
value of lawyers as service providers 1 7 with ethics grounded in the tradition
8
of the wise and confidential counselor. "
The deal-lawyering context replicates this broader attorney role tension,
especially for attorneys operating in regulation-influenced transactional
contexts. David Dana has identified in this context a conflict between what
he labels as the "client-service" model and the "public-service" model. 19
Dana argues that for lawyers drawn to practice in arenas infused with public
policy, a number of forces conspire to give primacy to client service over the
often vague and complex demands of any modern regulatory system. Taking
the realm of environmental compliance as an example, Dana highlights the
client-service gravitational pull of a number of forces. These forces include
the ease with which lawyers can find "loopholes" in complex regulatory
regimes, the tremendous volume and attendant practical difficulty of
following regulation, the increasing legal sophistication of clients who seek
to limit regulatory costs, and the limited incentives that such clients have to
120
go beyond minimal (or even sub-minimal) compliance.

113.

See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, EthicalLawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L.

REv. 1629, 1629-30 (2002) (summarizing the debate).
114. Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 389, 389 (2005).
115. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 11-162 (1993) (discussing a standard of professional ideals for lawyers).
116. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Layers as Leaders, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 266, 266-70
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/2/16/heineman.html (arguing that lawyers should

aspire to be "wise leaders").
117.

See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, ReinterpretingProfessionalIdentity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,

").
2, 6-7 (2003) ("[T he lawyer's role is grounded in a logic of service ....
118.

See Daniel Markovits, In Praise of the Supporting Cast, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 272,

277-78 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/2/16/markovits.html (describing the lawyer's
professional role as counsel).
119.
120.

See Dana, supra note 89, at 58-62 (discussing the different lawyering models).
Id, at 70-77.
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Echoing Dana's concerns with lawyer-client incentive structures, Victor
Fleischer examined the structural pressures on modern law firms doing
regulatory work. Fleischer argues that competition for the premium fees
available to firms operating at the "regulatory frontier"-areas of greatest
regulatory uncertainty-creates
incentives to approach
regulatory
constraints from the perspective most favorable to clients, regardless of the
121
policy goals involved or the orientation of the individual lawyer.
The intractable debate about proper attorney role orientation may be
sharpest where there is a clear conflict between what the "public interest"as indeterminate as that might be-and a private client's interest might
separately dictate. The spectrum of the alignment of interests in publicprivate partnerships, however, complicates this conflict by identifying
contexts in which societal demands-represented by the collective priorities
embodied in public policy-and client interests are not necessarily in
conflict. Again, whether as a question of the mission-driven orientation of
many entities that enter public-private partnership or as a function of
program design that aligns public goals and private incentives, in many
examples of public-private partnerships an attorney zealously operating in a
client-service role is at the same time operating in a public-service role.
This does, however, raise the question of the amount of latitude that
attorneys might have to act in a more public-regarding manner and whether
the alignment of interests that can arise in public-private partnerships
makes a difference. In other words, are lawyers-particularly business
lawyers-inevitably creatures of their professional context, structurally
oriented to advancing client goals narrowly defined as a function of
professional competition? Or, are lawyers sufficiently autonomous to
transcend the professional context and make individual choices about their
role-including which clients to choose, how to interact with those clients
when attorney and client policy preferences conflict, and how active a role
to take in centering policy goals in the transaction? That these conflicts are
likely to arise seems to be one implication of the dynamics that Dana
highlights. It may be true that the incentives run against contextual,
reflective lawyering that balances client interests with the larger public
implications of a transaction. But attorney autonomy is not easily dismissed,
and attorney latitude may be more a question of degree than a hard line
122
between individual choice and client prerogatives.

121.

See Fleischer, supra note 36 (manuscript at 33-34) (describing pressure on lawyers to

'read the relevant regulations in a manner that favors their client").
122.
Cf Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice,and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (1985) (arguing that although
lawyers in large firms privilege autonomy in conceptualizing legal institutions and attorney-

client relations, in practice, client-centered advocacy is the norm and lawyers "rarely experience
serious disagreement with the broader implications of a client's proposed course of conduct").
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Assuming that some attorneys can either transcend structural pressures
or operate in an environment in which goal conflicts do not predominate,
there is the separate question whether it is appropriate for the orientation of
transactional lawyers to vary from context to context. Should an attorney
representing a business in an ordinary deal with another business act any
differently than a lawyer involved in a functionally similar, but publicprivate, deal?
On one level, the answer must be no. Legal ethics at least begin with a
basic universalism.1 23 To suggest that there is some kind of more publicregarding role for lawyers where their clients are advancing public programs
is to risk denigrating the standards to which lawyers are generally held. But
on another level, differentiation may be appropriate where the public
aspects of a given transaction are a direct outcome-rather than potential
consequence-of a client's decision to engage in a public-private
transaction. To highlight the ability of deal lawyers to advance public goals
in public-private transactions is not to denigrate other lawyering
perspectives, but it is worth isolating this context nonetheless.
B. REGULATORY TRANSLATIONAND THE CULTURE OFLEGALISM
Gilson's vision of attorneys as transaction-cost engineers clearly carries a
normative gloss-deals take place that would otherwise collapse and value is
added in an absolute sense that would not be true but for the largely creative
work of deal-lawyer structuring. Fleischer's recognition that the value to be
gained in deal structuring in the contemporary regulatory environment can
be seen as a transfer from the state to private clients is a less positive story;
although as discussed, there is an empirical question about the nature of
12 4
public intervention that is at least contestable.
Placing the legal profession at the center of public policy through the
work of regulatory translation in public-private partnerships, however, can
raise other concerns. Particularly, this role may create perverse institutional
incentives for the public sector, may represent a barrier to entry for other
professionals to serve in this capacity, and can raise legitimate questions
about the distributional consequences of relying on the private bar for this
function.
1. Perverse Incentives in Problem Solving
Identifying the centrality of lawyers in translating the complex
regulatory structures that dominate public-private transactions raises

123. This universalism is not without critics. See Dolovich, supra note 113, at 1639-46
(discussing contextual legal ethics); Kruse, supra note 114, at 426-33 (same).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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It
concerns about the effect of such lawyering on this policy approach.
may be that legalism itself-the structure of legal norms and the
contemporary culture of the law as a form of governance-generates the
very problems that lawyers are then called upon to solve. 126 The role of the
attorney here, in other words, may reflect a politically constructed byproduct of the culture of legalism, and it is a fair point to acknowledge that
lawyers who help clients solve the very complexity the legal system creates
127
are in some sense complicit in creating those problems.
To identify what can be a salutary role for transactional lawyers in
public-private partnerships is not, however, to endorse an unmitigated
128
embrace of the proliferation of regulatory complexity. As discussed below,
there are advantages to regulatory transparency, and the state certainly has a
responsibility to reduce the need for regulatory translation. It may be that
having an able and creative transactional bar ready (for the appropriate
price) to step in and untangle complex regulatory and subsidy regimes
reduces the incentive for agencies to act transparently and in the most
efficient manner.
But there is a genuine-and genuinely unavoidable-complexity that
the multiple-bottom-line pluralism of value in public-private transactions
entails. A certain degree of regulatory complexity is necessary to achieve the
complex goals that run throughout modern public policy. While engaging
the private sector raises additional levels of complexity, the comparative
costs and benefits of that added complexity pose an empirical question for
which the contemporary literature as yet supplies no answer. 129 Choosing to
engage the private sector unavoidably raises transaction costs for public
projects. Given how steeped in law those particular complexities are, putting
lawyers in the foreground is unavoidable. Thus, whatever the balance that
can be discerned in ordinary private transactions, the law-related

125. Gilson identifies, for example, the barriers to transacting that come from information
asymmetry as a concern. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 280. Others have suggested that an element
of transacting culture that heightens mistrust may have to do with the business world "lawyering
up." Cf Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc.
REv. 55, 60-61, 65-67 (1963) (discussing the attitude of individuals in business toward the role
of lawyers and the settlement of disputes).
126. Cf Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 15-21 (1994) (discussing the role that lawyers play in shaping a culture
of "adversarial legalism").
127. Cf Gilson, supra note 1, at 246-47 ("[Llawyers are often the source of much of the
current regulatory jungle confronting those doing business. From this perspective, a client may
be less than grateful for salvation from the very problems the savior originally created.").
128. See infta Part VI.B.
129. Are the additional costs of complexity inherent in public-private approaches to policy
outweighed by the additional benefits such partnerships provide? Proponents and opponents
can cite competing statistics about comparative institutional advantage for private and public
providers, and the theoretical debate is exhaustive, but the underlying question remains
unanswered. See supra Part III.B.
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complexities that arise in the interface between public policy and private
130
transactions require skilled lawyering to manage.
A closely related concern is that privileging the ability of lawyers to add
value through regulatory translation might simply be a shield for attorney
rent seeking. Mark Suchman has argued, for example, that the behaviors
that Gilson identifies with value creation might instead be functions of
cultural or market barriers to entry. To Suchman, then, the complexity of
modern transactional practice suggests the possibility that "lawyers earn
131
their pay primarily as touts and bouncers for the prevailing legal regime."
Lisa Bernstein has questioned Suchman's hypothesis, noting that the value
that might arise from counseling, matchmaking, gatekeeping, and similar
non-legal roles lawyers can play.13 2 But empirically, it is difficult to
disentangle how much of the deal-lawyer role is a function of professional
self-protection and how much is a question of marginal value to the client.
Perhaps the most salient response to this concern is that to the extent that
business lawyers and clients identify this conflict, there may be ways to mute
the potential for mischief it represents. We will return to the argument for
1 33
transparency in this aspect of the attorney-client relationship below.
2.

Who Bears the Cost?

Assuming that regulatory translation can add value to deals in the way
that this Article argues, a final concern arises over the question of whether
private clients should bear what is, in some sense, a public cost. In working to
translate regulatory requirements for private clients, lawyers could be seen as
shifting value from the private sector to the government and undermining
public incentives for transparency and consistency. In regulatory arbitrage,
the value added to the transacting parties comes directly or indirectly from
reducing the cost of some public intervention. In paradigm examples of
regulatory translation, however, the direction of benefits is less obvious. In
some instances, clients may benefit from advancing public goals, given their
mission orientation or the incentive structure of a program. In other cases,
private attorneys are essentially charging private parties to reduce costs
134
imposed by the public sector in a way that is arguably a public benefit.

130. This would be true for both regulatory craftsmanship and for regulatory translation,
but the "value" added in the latter context advances relevant policy goals rather than seeking to
create private value by arbitraging their limitations.
131. Suchman, supra note 16, at 267.
132. Bernstein, Silicon Valley, supra note 1, at 245-51.
133. See infra Part VI.A.
134. The same question would not arise when lawyers are creating value through regulatory
craftsmanship because, by definition, any gain to the client is a cost to the state (again setting
aside the normative questions that this raises). In regulatory translation, there is the possibility
of gain to the client and gain to the state, and in that situation, it may be that the state is, in
some sense, free riding on the private sector's engagement of private lawyers.
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One answer may come from client orientation to public policy. Where a
client is dedicated to the relevant goals in a given policy area, the benefit
they gain from creative lawyering inheres as much to the private client as it
does to the government or the public beneficiaries. Of course, some portion
of private parties engaged in public-private partnerships do so less from
their own motivations and more from the relevant public incentives. In
those cases (and perhaps more generally), it may be an implicit element of
the relevant subsidy that private parties bear the cost of the attendant
complexity. This remains a non-trivial concern nonetheless.
Ultimately, there is a potential salutary normative point for
transactional lawyering that these various concerns highlight. Given that the
public sector is increasingly engaging the private sector to advance public
goals, is there a constructive role for deal lawyers to play-and to understand
themselves to be playing-that maximizes the value, broadly speaking, of
such partnerships? I think on balance the answer is yes, but cautiously so.
VI. IMPLICATIONS

As noted at the outset, this Article seeks to bridge two discourses that
rarely intersect. By and large, scholars focused on the work of transactional
lawyers have made assumptions about the potential alignment of interests
between the private and public sectors that are increasingly unrealistic in
modern practice. Conversely, scholars focused on public-private
partnerships and the broader questions posed by privatization have
generally ignored the role of transactional lawyers who stand at the
threshold of so much public-private interaction. This Part accordingly
explores the implications of this intersection in two directions-for the
value-creation literature and for the various parties involved in publicprivate partnerships.
A.

UNDERSTANDING THE INTERMEDIARY

The vision this Article presents of deal lawyers in public-private
partnerships is certainly something of an ideal type. As a descriptive matter,
it is impossible (or at least impractical) to discern empirically how most
lawyers in practice see their own role in this context. Where and under what
conditions regulatory translation shades into the more adversarial work of
regulatory arbitrage is rarely going to be sharp. It is hard to deny, however,
that some sectors of the private bar see their role when representing clients
in public-private partnerships as broader than simply advancing client
interests, narrowly defined. Regardless of the empirics of this role identity,
however, there is value in clearly identifying the role and advantages in
embracing that role.
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1. Embracing the Translator's Task
Understanding the value that deal lawyers can create through
regulatory translation can give lawyers a new perspective to approach the
task with better awareness of the comparative advantage they bring to deals.
One of Gilson's goals in positing a theory of value creation for transactional
lawyers was to highlight the competition that lawyers face from other
professionals and potential market participants. As Gilson noted, there is
nothing traditional or inherently "legal" about the type of transaction-cost
engineering that he identified, and other professions could just as easily step
135
in to add the same value.
This assumption, however, has much less force in the kind of regulatory
environments in which public-private partnerships unfold. Because of the
involvement of the government-involvement that is most often expressed
through complex legal language-there is no escaping the centrality of
lawyers to what, in other contexts, would tend to be non-legal aspects of a
transaction. In this way, lawyers are not just leveraging their capability to
understand and render comprehensible the mass of governmental
requirements and constraints attached to most subsidies (as much as can be
done) to take on additional tasks as drafters or negotiators or the like.
Lawyers are instead adding unique value by operating simultaneously in the
world of private transactional structures and public policies expressed
136
through regulatory language.
Another aspect of economies of scope available for deal lawyers in
public-private partnerships is that lawyers can add value for clients as they
leverage the experience of working on one challenging regulation-driven
transaction to other such transactions. It is hardly cost-effective for most
participants in many of the areas of policy at the heart of public-private
partnerships-arenas that often involve confronting daunting social
challenges with severe resource constraints-to invest in the information
necessary to understand evolving regulatory requirements that may
represent only a marginal risk in any given deal. Lawyers who specialize in
various areas of public-private interaction, by contrast, can and do develop
expertise, the costs of which can be spread across multiple clients. More so

135. Gilson, supra note 1, at 295. Gilson noted that economies of scope-the ability
efficiently to apply the same investment to more than one outcome-should give lawyers an
advantage in performing the non-legal aspects of transaction structuring, such as drafting,
valuation, and due diligence. Id. at 298. But this comparative advantage is not necessarily
grounded in deal lawyers' expertise as lawyers.
136. Housing provides many examples of other professionals who play prominent roles in
instantiating policy goals. Accountants, for example, are active players, as are bond specialists,
financial advisors, deal consultants, title companies, insurers, and others. As in more privateoriented transactions, much of the work of deal lawyers involves coordinating other
professionals, but the centrality of regulation-legal strictures--gives greater justification for
this otherwise non-legal lawyer-coordinating function.
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than economies of scope in the purely private context, this has the potential
to create a store of knowledge that reduces the costs for participants and
diffuses best practices.
Recognizing this inevitable market niche, however, does not mean that
lawyers should exploit that advantage to capture more value from a
transaction than they add or than other potential participants might more
efficiently provide. If a client or a less costly third-party professional can play
a role more efficiently than deal lawyers now do, it is incumbent upon deal
lawyers to cede that role. They should do so not out of some altruistic regard
for their clients (although that should not be dismissed), but rather because
the overall value to clients-and to the public-can be increased by more
37
targeted specialization.1
If, as the value-creation literature suggests, transactional attorneys can
overcome barriers that clients may not understand or appreciate to
maximize the value of mutually beneficial exchange, there may be grounds
for a more sanguine view of the potential for similar unearthing of hidden
value in public-private transactions.
2.

Reorienting Client Perspectives

An important insight to be gleaned from the spectrum of alignments to
the state is that attorney identification with client goals poses challenges
beyond the public-private transactional context. Although exploring a rich
variety of micro-goals, particularly as regulatory-cost engineering comes to
the fore, the traditional literature on value creation has had an ultimately
reductionist perspective on the macro-orientation of transactional law.

137. One curious cultural aspect that marks transactional lawyering in at least some areas of
public-private transacting is that attorneys seem open to sharing knowledge, document forms,
and experience working with the various agencies involved. The members of the American Bar
Association's listserv for affordable-housing and community-development law, for example,
regularly engage in ongoing discussions of arcane regulatory questions, and an ethos seems to
prevail that focuses on mutual support. Lawyers share insights and provide detailed feedback on
regulatory interpretation (and the extent to which such interpretation has been accepted by
agencies and market participants). This is an anecdotal impression, to be sure, and there are
certainly other areas of legal practice where lawyers offer each other continuing legal
education, and regulatory and other legal knowledge is considered something of a common
stock. One can speculate that this is because attorneys see reciprocal advantage to be gained
from this exchange of knowledge, but it is at least possible that this ethos has developed
because of an awareness among housing deal lawyers that there is an important aspect of their
work that is much closer to David Dana's public-service model than the kinds of conflicts Dana
associated with the client-service model in heavily regulated sectors of the economy. Dana
argued that where regulatory constraints were clear and draconian, there would be no conflict
between what client service and public service would demand of a lawyer. Dana, supra note 89,
at 59-60. Dana rightly pointed out that this is rarely, if ever, the case. See id. (discussing the real
world of ambiguous and inconsistent regulation that raises the conflict between models of
lawyering). But in public-private partnerships, it may be that the very complexity of relevant
regulations creates a culture of mutual support among attorneys aware of the public orientation
of their work.
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Clients are assumed to seek value solely in terms of monetizable increments
of gain, regardless of any other metrics.
This is not to deny the vast heartland of transactional law in which
clients are, by and large, driven by ordinary business concerns. But, it is still
important to complicate this vision by recognizing that not only are there
non-traditional ways of creating traditional value,138 there are also more
private clients who might have a broader vision of value than is often
assumed in the literature.
If, as the value-creation literature highlights, lawyers are only worth
their added value, then their use must be justified and even more so in
transactions that revolve around the deployment of scarce public resources.
Anecdotally, critiques of transactional lawyering as adding unjustified costs
ring as true, if not more so, for clients in public-private transactions as in
traditional dealmaking, especially where transactions exist on narrow
margins and subsidies are perennially limited.
Understanding the value that transactional lawyers add to publicprivate transactions thus has implications for clients. For example, this
perspective can lead clients to develop in-house expertise where
appropriate, as many players in the housing arena have done. This
perspective can also lead clients to be less reluctant to engage attorneys
when the necessity for regulatory translation is most acute. Therefore,
separating out and recognizing the value added in regulatory translation
sharpens the client's decisional matrix about engaging lawyers.
Moreover, given the potential for attorneys to develop regulatory
expertise that transcends any given client, participants in public-private
partnerships understand the cost savings that such leveraging might provide.
Again, this raises an empirical question about the relative cost and benefit of
that repeat-transactional role for attorneys, but there is at least some
evidence in the context of regulatory arbitrage that clients recognize that
lawyers can add this value. 139 There is no reason to believe that the same
function cannot be brought to the fore in transactional contexts where there
is more of an alignment of public and private interests.
One aspect of client attitudes toward deal lawyers in public-private
partnerships may stem from the connection between the need for regulatory
translation and the concomitant provision of the lawyers' services.1 40 This
concern is appropriate, but somewhat misplaced. Regulatory complexity is
an inevitable cost of involvement in public-private partnerships, and the
question is how best to manage that complexity.
138. See generally Fleischer, supra note 90 (discussing brand image as a factor in corporate
deal structures).
139. See Fleischer, supra note 36 (manuscript at 26-27) (discussing the premium that firms
command for performing regulatory work and the legal-market context in which lawyers can
obtain a premium for that expertise).
140. See supra Part V.B.
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B.

RE-ENGINEERING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

To return, finally, to the debate about privatization,14 1 regulatory
translation has the potential to advance the benefits of engaging the private
sector in public policy and to mitigate some of its downsides. For private
clients, transactional lawyers can apply the same kinds of value-creation
techniques to public-policy goals. For the government, however, being able
to engage a private transactional bar capable of engineering private
transactions to advance public goals greatly expands the reach and range of
public-private partnerships.
1. Maximizing the Value of Engaging the Private Sector
If deal lawyers can structure private incentives to bring them in line with
public goals, as this Article has argued, the process can help the government
achieve its goals through the language of private law in a way that can be
hard for agencies steeped in policy to manage effectively. This is not to
suggest that policyrnakers or government attorneys necessarily lack
sophistication about their private counterparts, but rather, that transactional
attorneys who operate in both worlds can add value to the public.
Considering the problems of privatization, if private-sector involvement
in public policy is to be measured by the extent to which it enhances the
efficiency of public-sector goals while not undermining the accountability of
public oversight, it is through the basic mechanics of private agreement that
this dynamic plays out. One function of regulatory translation, then, is
potentially to enhance efficiency given the alignment of public and private
interests. Of course, the devil is in the details and lawyers may miss the mark,
but as an aspiration, connecting a pluralistic vision of value creation by deal
lawyers to the potential to enhance efficiency foregrounds a role for lawyers
that has largely been absent in discussions of privatization.
The risk of losing accountability in shifting more responsibility to the
private sector is a more complex question, as it is the arena where public
and private interests are most likely to diverge. But, however the government
chooses to structure its oversight, it is in the realm of private ordering that
such oversight takes on meaning. This inevitably places lawyers in the
middle of actuating the mechanisms of oversight. In public-private
partnerships, and privatization more generally, it is not enough for the state
to issue a command and hope that the private sector responds-there are
complex, intertwined relationships that can develop over the long run that
can make any unilateral oversight subject to any number of practical
difficulties. This places a burden on the government side of the equation to
manage the articulation and measurement of goals carefully, recognizing
that there are costs as well as benefits to oversight. It also suggests a

141.

See supra Part III.B.
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potentially positive role for lawyers in bringing a variety of practical tools to
142
questions of oversight.
2.

Government Cooperation in Regulatory Translation

Given that governments at all levels find it in the public interest to
engage the private sector in serving the public, there may be more that
agencies can do to facilitate the regulatory-translation function of deal
lawyering. The Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"),
for example, has attempted in recent years to foster what former HUD
General Counsel Keith Gottfried described as regulatory transparency in its
dealings with the housing bar. 143 More can be done by all agencies involved
in public-private partnerships to make the implementation of public
programs through the medium of private transactional law more
transparent, regardless of the content of the regulatory requirements the
government finds necessary for the public interest.
Agencies in general can understand that public-private partnerships
cannot simply involve the imposition of public goals on private participants,
no matter how willing or enthusiastic those participants may be. There are
direct costs to regulatory complexity, and those costs are not borne
exclusively (or even primarily in some cases) by the private entities that serve
the public in these partnerships. Given the types of assets often involved in
public-private transactions-such as infrastructure, housing, and other
facilities-initial deal structures have long-term effects. This means that
government entities, no less than their private counterparts, have to pay
careful attention to asset management over time. It is through the
obligations that lawyers craft to align long-term incentives and interests that
the public interest is advanced.
Moreover, returning to the role of private deal-lawyer economies of
scope, it is unlikely to be in the government's interest to undertake the work
of matching general regulatory goals to the vast array of specifically situated
private entities engaged in advancing those goals. Translation by lawyers in
the context of specific transactions-information that can be taken to scale
by those lawyers-seems an appropriate intermediate solution.
142. It might seem like an inherent conflict to represent a private client subject to oversight
in a public-private transaction and in any way to assist in public oversight; yet, in practice, there
may be more of an alignment of interests than at first appears. There is a political dynamic of
reaction to failure in privatization-a kind of ratcheting effect-that undermines what makes
public-private partnerships potentially advantageous to both sides. To the extent that skillful
eliciting of issues can avoid the ratcheting effect-such as private benchmarks and the
consequences of failure-"value" is added to a public-private transaction in a similar overall
net-benefit manner as Gilson identified for purely private transaction-cost reductions.
143.
See Keith E. Gottfried, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Remarks at
the National Settlement Services Summit (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/ogc/gotfriedrefresh/remarksofkgottfriedatsetlementservicessummit.pdf
(discussing
regulatory transparency).
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In the end, both sides in public-private partnerships have to recognize
the consequences of interrelating between two cultures. The world of public
subsidies is grounded in budget cycles, public scrutiny, political risk, and
changing policy priorities. The world of private dealmaking is grounded in
risk allocation, information management, and other tools of private
bargaining. Deal lawyers are uniquely situated to play a mediating role
between these two worlds.
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article brings to the fore an important transactional dynamic
ignored in the extensive literature on value creation by deal lawyers.
Understanding the role that transactional lawyers play in public-private
partnerships has the potential to shed light on how best to harvest the fruits
of this increasingly important aspect of public policy. This is not to endorse
the engagement of the private sector without an appropriate awareness of
the potential pitfalls that such engagement may entail. Rather, it is to
recognize that if a public entity has made the threshold decision to partner
with the private sector, it is often the largely unheralded work of private deal
lawyers translating policy goals into the mechanisms of private ordering that
makes these partnerships work.
A "regulatory translation" perspective on the role of lawyers in publicprivate transactions can help lawyers, their clients, and the public sector
obtain value-in the broadest sense of the word-out of these partnerships.
Just as lawyers in purely private transactions can recognize hidden barriersand hidden opportunities for mutual gain-lawyers in public-private
transactions can craft deal structures and the relationships that flow from

them in ways that enhance the overall benefits sought by the transaction. It
is perhaps a modest role for lawyers to play; yet, given how infused the basic
vocabulary of public-private partnerships is with the language of law, it is a
role that private lawyers are uniquely suited to play.
Ultimately, there is a larger lesson for all deal lawyers: craft matters
beyond the four corners of the deal. There are third parties who bear at
least some of the costs and share some of the benefits of even the most
narrowly bilateral agreement, and there are larger public concerns in every
transaction. Whether the demands of client orientation or the latitude a
lawyer has in any given deal allow an attorney to weigh those concerns fully,
the larger public context matters. Deal lawyers can-and it is admittedly only
ever a possibility-act to balance a multitude of values in the ideal role of
adding value.
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